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The issue of fairness in strategic interactions 
 
Thesis overview  
 
The main aim of this doctoral thesis is to examine the issue of fairness in strategic 
interactions. More specifically, the research here presented investigated, through three 
main experimental studies and the replication of one of them at the University of 
Leiden, whether previous “experiences” could affect decisions in strategic games, such 
as the Ultimatum Game (UG, Guth et al., 1982) and the Dictator Game (DG, Kahneman 
et al., 1986). Furthermore, it was investigated whether this hypothesized effect was 
mediated by the emotional reaction elicited by these previous experiences and/or by 
emotions and beliefs strictly related to the decisions.   
The UG and the DG are two economic tasks widely used in the social decision-making 
literature, since their simple and versatile structure allows to introduce numerous 
readjustments and to test different theoretical hypotheses (see for a review Camerer, 
2003, and Guth and Kocher, 2014). In both games a participant (the proposer) is called 
to decide how to divide a sum of money given by the experimenter between herself and 
the other participant (the receiver), who has the power to refuse division (if he/she does 
not agree with it) in the UG, but who can do nothing in the DG. In the UG, if the 
receiver refuses the offer, both players receive nothing. According to the perspective of 
the rational choice theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944, 1979), in the UG the 
proposer should offer 1 unit to the receiver, who should accept any proposal, since any 
offered sum is better than zero. In the DG proposers, who have the possibility to keep 
the entire budget for themselves without backwash, should offer nothing. Actually, in 
numerous studies (see for a review Camerer, 2003; Guth and Kocher, 2014) 
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participants’ behaviour differs from theoretical predictions. In the UG, proposers 
generally offer around half of the initial amount, whereas receivers reject, in at least 
half of cases, very low offers. In the DG, proposers give around 20% of the total amount 
to the receivers (Forsythe and co., 1994; Kagel and Roth, 1997). Thus people in this 
kind of tasks do not behave selfishly, as classical economic theories predicted, but 
rather show a general tendency towards fairness. Especially in the subsequent literature 
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Pillutla and Murninghan, 1995, 
2003; Kahneman, 2003; van Damme et al., 2014; Sanfey, 2017), many psychological 
factors have been called into question to explain this fair behaviour.  
The structure of the thesis is the following. First of all, the theoretical framework, 
within which the three experimental studies (and the replication of the last one) have 
been conceived, will be examined and the most important theories about fairness in 
social decision-making will be presented. Afterwards, the studies will be described. 
The UG and the DG have been included in a wider framework of interaction between 
two players and a two-stage paradigm was used. It was investigated only the role of 
proposer, since the thesis focused on the factors leading people to make fair vs. selfish 
choices.  
In study 1, the experience lived in the first stage was represented by a luck game, played 
by both participants individually. They started the experiment with a certain number of 
tokens, that could increase or decrease through a series of draw at the luck game (whose 
results were actually manipulated). The tokens held at the end of the luck game had to 
be divided afterwards in the UG or the DG. This division was done without knowing 
the other budget.  
In studies 2 and 3, previous experiences were represented by cognitive tasks, through 
which participants had to accumulate the score needed to play the second stage of the 
experiment (actually never played). The results of these tasks were manipulated in 
conformity with the experimental conditions of each study. In both studies participants 
were told that they were playing with another player with whom they were connected 
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via Internet (actually there was no other player). The UG or the DG was presented as 
the last game of the first stage. In fact, the experiment ended after this game.  
In the studies 2 and 3 it was introduced an ever-increasing competitiveness between 
the two players, by making victory at the whole game more and more important. 
Competitiveness was absent in the first study. 
In the end, a replication of study 3 with a students’ sample of the University of Leiden 
will be described. This replication was conducted during my visiting period in this 
University, under the supervision of Prof. Eric van Dijk, professor of psychology and 
social decision-making. 
In conclusion, I will discuss theoretical and practical aspects of the results obtained in 
the four experimental studies. 
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Chapter 1: Theoretical bases 
 
 
1. Social decision-making and strategic interactions 
 
Decision-making is the cognitive process that, based on the evaluation of the aspects 
or potential outcomes concerning the available options, leads to the choice of one of 
them. Most decisions in daily life are taken in uncertain conditions (Schermerhorn et 
al., 2005) since people often do not have  - or are unable to process adequately - all the 
needed information about available alternatives and their outcomes. The uncertainty is 
also due to the interaction with at least one other person that implies for decision-
makers to taking into account reactions, expectations and preferences of other actors 
that are uncertain by nature (Fehr and Camerer, 2007; Sanfey, 2007). Such decisions, 
made in a social interaction context, are defined as strategic interactions and are 
formalized in the concept of game.  
Game Theory is the mathematical discipline that deals with this type of decisions. The 
birth of this discipline is traced back to 1944 with the release of the book "Theory of 
Games and Economic Behaviour" by the mathematician John von Neumann and the 
economist Oskar Morgenstern. According to the authors, in an uncertain decision 
situation, players choose the combination to which the highest expected utility is 
associated, namely the alternative that offers the highest gains and/or the lowest losses. 
In 1950, the mathematician John Nash formalized a sophisticated “solution” for the 
problem of how rational players should play in these types of interactions, then called 
Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium in a game situation is reached when all players 
choose a strategy, which, if changed, would give no advantage to any players. This is 
equivalent to say that from such a situation everyone gets the maximum expected utility 
possible. A behaviour that violates these predictions would be considered an exception 
rather than a rule. 
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However, the results of numerous experimental studies conducted in the fields of 
experimental economic and psychology in the last 70 years (see for a review Camerer, 
2003; Guth and Kocher, 2014) have shown instead that players, far from be completely 
self-interested, seem to behave in a fair manner and to have concerns for the others’ 
wellness.  
 
2. Ultimatum Game and Dictator Game 
 
The Ultimatum Game (UG, Guth, Schmittberger and Schwarze, 1982) and the Dictator 
Game (DG, Kahneman et al., 1986; Forsythe et al., 1994) are two of the most used 
games to study strategic interactions.  
The UG is an economic task in which two participants (a “proposer” and a “receiver”) 
must decide how to divide a sum of money given by the experimenter. The rules of this 
game are very easy. The proposer can offer a part of the total amount to the receiver. 
The receiver can, in turn, either accept or reject it. Both players are informed that if the 
receiver will accept the proposer’s offer, the amount of money will be divided 
according to this decision. However, if the receiver, for some reason, decides to reject 
the offer, then neither player will receive anything. This game is called "Ultimatum 
Game" just because the choice of the proposer is placed to the receiver as an ultimatum 
to “take it or leave it”.  
 
Image 1. Diagram of the UG. P = proposer; R = receiver; x = offer; c = initial amount of money. The 
present image was inspired by image traceable to the following internet address: 
https://tex.stackexchange.com/questions/292575/improve-tree-aspect-forest. 
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From the perspective of the rational choice theories, the perfect proposer should offer 
as little as possible to the other participant, keeping for herself most of the sum 
received. In the same way, the rational receiver should accept any proposal, since any 
offered sum is better than having nothing (in case of rejecting offer). Therefore, the 
Nash equilibrium in this game is reached when proposer offers 1 unit to the receiver, 
who accepts.  
Nevertheless, numerous studies (Guth et al., 1982; Camerer, 2003; van’t Wout, 2006; 
Guth and Kocher, 2014) have shown that people actually play in what appears as a fair 
manner: proposers offer generally around 40-50% of the initial amount; receivers 
reject, in at least half of cases, offers lower than 20-30% of the total amount. Since the 
fair proposals could be explained by a general disposition towards fairness, but also by 
an expectation of other's rejection of too low offers, a game (with a very similar 
structure of the UG), in which the receiver has no possibility of rejecting, was created: 
the Dictator Game (DG, Kahneman et al., 1986; Forsythe et al., 1994). Kahneman and 
colleagues (1986) were the firsts to remove the receiver’s possibility to reject the offers. 
Moreover they gave to proposers the opportunity to choose between two alternative 
distributions of 20 $: 10$ for proposer/10$ for receiver or 18$ for proposer/2$ for 
receiver. The 75% of the proposers chose the fair option (the first one), even if the 
receiver had no possibility of revenge. Therefore, players in the role of proposers 
decided to lose 8$ by giving them to receivers. Was this choice motivated by a genuine 
sense of fairness or by a too strong unfairness of the second option? Forsythe and 
colleagues (1994) tried to answer to this question by giving full freedom of choice to 
the proposers: they could decide freely how much to donate to receivers, who in any 
case cannot do anything. Also in this condition, almost 60% of proposers offered 
around 20% of the total amount (Forsythe and co., 1994; Kagel and Roth, 1997). 
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Since the other participant has no decisional power in the DG, this game is often used 
as an altruism measure, namely a measure of how much someone is willing to donate 
to someone else at a personal cost for her. 
The results obtained with this game (Forsythe et al., 1994; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; 
Charness and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004), but also those obtained with 
other games (as for example the Prisoner’s dilemma, Tucker, 1950 or the Trust Game, 
Berg et al., 1995) represent a strong experimental evidence of a general tendency 
towards fairness.  
 
3. About fairness 
 
Regarding the motivations underlying fair behaviour, there are two main theoretical 
positions: one represented by “social preferences models”, according to which positive 
offers at both UG and DG are essentially driven by a honest concern towards others 
(pro-social motivations); the other represented by the authors that instead consider fair 
offers as strategic means to avoid the offer rejection and thus to earn more (pro-self 
motivations). 
Social preferences models mainly take into account three types of social preferences: 
the inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000); 
reciprocity (Fehr and Gachter, 2000; Fishbacher, Gachther and Fehr, 2001); social-
welfare (Charness and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004, 2006). The common 
idea behind social preferences models is that human beings are driven not only by self-
centered motives but also by high social values (like honesty, justice and aversion to 
inequity). In the name of these values people would be willing to renounce to personal 
reward if it is obtained at the expense of other individuals. In other words, people take 
care of others’ welfare as well as of their own. According to this perspective, in a 
bargaining situation, decision-makers tend not only to maximize their own payoffs, but 
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also to reduce the gap between their and others’ payoffs: they do not like to have less 
than others, since it could provoke envy, but neither having much more than them, 
since it could induce guilt. They are “inequity averse” (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, 2006; 
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). An important suggestion coming from these theories is 
that, in strategic games such as the UG, decision-makers take into account not only the 
material consequences of the resources’ distribution but also the intention transmitted 
by the proposal itself. The same low offer is more likely to be rejected when it is the 
most unfair of the available options, compared to when it is not the worst. In the former 
case, the proposer had the possibility to behave more fairly and did not do so, whereas 
in the latter case the proposer is perceived to be willing to treat the receiver as fairly as 
possible (Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher, 1999). Behaving in conformity to the perceived 
behaviour of the proposer corresponds to the social norm of reciprocity (Fehr and 
Gachter, 2000; Fishbacher, Gachter and Fehr, 2001; Fehr and Fishbacher, 2006), in 
accordance with which everyone deserves to be treated how she treats others. In 
response to an action with a positive or negative effect on them, people will respond 
very probably with an action that has the same (or almost the same) positive or negative 
value (Fehr and Gachter, 2000; Fishbacher, Goether and Fehr, 2001; Fehr and 
Fishbacher, 2006). Very close to these theories is the Rabin’s concept of “fairness 
equilibrium” (1993), or “reciprocal fairness equilibrium” (Charness and Rabin, 
2002). According to these authors, and contrarily to the Nash equilibrium, what people 
actually try to maximize is the “social utility”. In this view, players are concerned in 
improving “social surplus” (i.e. the sum of their payoffs plus the others' payoffs) and 
are willing to renounce even to personal incomes if this allows augmenting the profits 
of those with low earnings (Rabin, 1993; Charness and Rabin, 2002). Moreover, in this 
view, positive offers in the DG, where receivers have no decisional power and no 
possibility to take revenge, are the strongest evidences in favor of people’s altruism.  
An opposed view is that of the second line of scholars, which assert that fair offers in 
the UG actually are based on instrumental self-interested motives: to avoid low-offer 
rejection and to earn more (Straub and Murnighan, 1995; Pillutla and Murninghan, 
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1995, 2003; van Dijk, De Cremer and Handgraaf, 2004; Ding et al., 2014; Chen et al., 
2017). In Greenberg’ words (1990), proposing a fair distribution to a receiver who has 
the power to reject the offer is the result of an apparent rather than a real fairness. 
Empirical evidence in favor of this hypothesis is represented by the results obtained in 
studies (Straub and Murnighan, 1995; Pillutla and Murnighan, 1995) that used a 
symmetric/asymmetric information paradigm, in which only half of the receivers were 
informed about the proposers’ initial amount (symmetric condition). The other half did 
not know it (asymmetric condition). It was found that the majority of proposers made 
fair offers only in the symmetric condition. The receivers in the asymmetric condition 
had no reference points to evaluate the offer, and thus more unequal offers were made 
to them. In a similar way, Kagel, Kim and Moser (1996) conducted a study in which 
the tokens to divide were worth more for the proposers than to the receivers (each token 
was worth 0.10 for the receivers and 0.30 for the proposers). In an experimental 
condition both proposers and receivers were informed about the tokens’ real value; in 
the other experimental condition, only proposers knew it, whereas the receivers were 
told that tokens had the same value for both players. Results showed that in the former 
condition, proposers skillfully divided the initial amount (i.e. 100 tokens) so that both 
players would earn the same payoff (i.e. 25-75, where 25*0,30=7,5 and 75*0,10=7,5). 
On the contrary, in the other condition, most of proposers offered around half of the 
amount to the ignorant receivers, so that they could earn more (i.e. 50-50, where 
50*0,30=750 and 50*0,10=250). 
By using the MAO (Minimum Acceptable Offer) paradigm, Ding and colleagues 
(2014) found that the majority of proposers offered around 30% of the total amount, 
corresponding to the minimum acceptance threshold declared by receivers. Thus, 
proposers decide to offer the bare minimum to the receivers, revealing, according to 
the authors, only concern in avoiding rejections. In a more recent study, Chen and 
colleagues (2017) asked proposers at UG to choose between two types of proposals: a 
fair offer vs. a very unfair one in a condition, and a fair vs. slightly unfair offer in 
another condition. The results showed that in the first condition people prefer to make 
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fair offers compared to the very unfair ones, but in the second condition, most of the 
proposers choose the slightly unfair offer rather than the fair one. According to the 
authors, from a strategic point of view, fair offers are more effective than the clearly 
unfair ones because they guarantee an almost certain gain, since for the receiver it 
would be very disadvantageous to reject them. However, if the risk of rejection is low, 
as it is supposed to be in front of a slightly unfair offer, participants prefer to propose 
the latter rather than an equitable subdivision. Therefore proposers in the UG seem to 
behave like “sophisticated profit maximizers” (Camerer and Thaler, 1995). In this 
perspective, in the DG, where the receiver is completely powerless, positive offers 
would be ascribed to a feelings of social responsibility towards receivers’ 
powerlessness (Greenberg, 1978) rather than an endogenous sense of fairness, leading 
proposer to be a “benevolent dictator” (van Dijk and Vermunt, 1999). The results found 
by van Dijk and Vermunt (1999) represent an empirical evidence of this idea. The 
authors conducted a study with the same paradigm used by Kagel and colleagues 
(1996), but testing proposers’ behaviour in both the UG and the DG. They found that, 
in the UG the proposers’ behaviour depended effectively on whether either players or 
only proposer knew the chips’ real value. On the contrary, proposers in the DG were 
not influenced by receivers’ ignorance about chips’ real value. They in fact gave always 
a certain number of chips such that both players’ payoffs were fairly shared. In this 
way they acted as a “benevolent dictator”, even if the receivers could not have judged 
their unfair offers negatively.  
In the UG the proposers’ power seems to act in a different way. Ciampaglia and 
colleagues (2014) by using a not-economic version of the UG, in which participants 
had to share a workload, assigned less or more power to one of the two players. They 
found that proposers with more power, rather than acting with “benevolence”, took 
advantage from the situation and gave about 20 % less to the weakest recipients 
compared to the offers made in a situation of balanced power. 
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These results suggest that sometimes people adjust their behaviour based on contextual 
cues. The sense of fairness seems to be influenced by contextual factors (Frey and 
Bohnet, 1995). 
 
4. Contextual factors influencing social decision-making 
 
Different contextual factors have been taken into account in several studies in order to 
show how they affect decision behaviour. 
For example, differences in one-shot versus repeated UG are reported in several 
studies (Slembeck, 1999; Boles, Croson and Murnighan, 2000). Repetition gives to 
players the opportunity to build a reputation, be it positive or negative. Therefore, 
subjects playing the UG could behave fairly to show to the other participant that they 
are fair and upright persons and, thus, entitled to request the same treatment from the 
other, in a way consistent with the reciprocity theory (Fehr and Gachter, 2000; 
Fishbacher, Goether and Fehr, 2001; Fehr and Fishbacher, 2006). This could lead both 
proposers and receivers closer to the fairness equilibrium (Boles, Croson and 
Murnighan, 2000). However, in an opposite way, repetition could also be used by some 
kinds of “tough proposers” as a possibility to communicate to the receivers that they 
want to earn as much as possible and that they will never offer more (Slembeck, 1999).  
Another important factor that seems to have a relevant effect on the offer is the identity 
of the opponent. For example, knowing something about the kindness of the other 
participant could arise a liking in the dictators and lead to higher offers (Bohnet and 
Frey, 1999). The important role of the "personification" of the opponent in a bargaining 
interaction has also been shown by studies that compared offers made by a real person 
vs. a computer (Sanfey et al., 2003; van’t Wout et al., 2006). These studies reported 
higher levels of anger and rejection in response to unfair offers made by real persons 
rather than by a computer. On the opposite side, by increasing the anonymity between 
players, and therefore by increasing social distance between them (in the meaning of 
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“degree of reciprocity that subjects believe exist within a social interaction”, Hoffman 
et al., 1996, pp. 654), Hoffman and colleagues (1996) have shown that offers 
systematically decrease.  
Personal value, in terms of self-affirmation, also seems to influence behaviour in the 
UG and the DG. Regarding receivers, in the UG, several authors argue that rejecting 
unfair offers, considered "psychologically offensive", calls into question personal 
dignity (Thaler, 1988; Zhang, 2008, 2009; Athanasiou et al., 2015). Evidences in favor 
of this hypothesis would be the higher rejection rates when the offers are associated 
with outrageous sentences (Kravitz and Gunto, 1992), when they are made by a person 
rather than by a computer (Blount, 1995; van’t Wout et al., 2006), and when receivers’ 
sense of self-affirmation is high (Gu et al., 2016). Regarding proposers (in both UG 
and DG), it has been shown that the thought of having more rights on the budget to be 
shared leads participants to make more unfair offers. In the DG around 80% of the 
proposers randomly assigned to the "more right" status gave less than 40% of the total 
sum to the receivers (Hoffman et al., 1992).  
Having more “rights” on the budget to divide is a factor that, beyond the personal value, 
calls into question also other issues strictly related to experiences lived before the UG 
and the DG, through which people can “create” the amount to divide. In the classical 
versions of the UG and the DG, the amount to share between the two players was a 
“free gift” made by the experimenter (Guth et al., 1982; Kahneman et al., 1986; 
Forsythe et al., 1994) and thus no sense of entitlement about it was induced. However, 
some studies induced a sense of the entitlement in participants by using a two-stage 
paradigm, in which the amount to split in the second stage was earned by participants 
in the first stage through different tasks that involved personal skills (Hoffman et al., 
1994; Cherry et al., 2002; Cappelen et al., 2007, 2010; Ciampaglia, 2014). These 
studies revealed that the participants who believe to have been most capable than the 
other player behave in a more selfish way, offering less to her compared to the 
participants in which no sense of entitlement was induced. Cappelen and colleagues 
(2007, 2010) argued that what happens in the “production phase” (i.e. in the first stage) 
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affects behaviour in the “distribution phase” (i.e. in the second stage) based on what 
ideals of fairness people consider more important for them. They identified three ideals 
of fairness that could guide distributional behaviour: i) first, a strict egalitarianism, 
according to which it is needed to equalize the inequalities, regardless of how these 
inequalities were reached; ii) second, a libertarianism that entails giving to someone 
only what she produced; iii) third, a liberal egalitarianism that justifies only the 
inequalities produced by factors under own control, namely the results of deliberate 
choices and/or personal abilities. In the study presented in 2007 they found that most 
of participants in the DG behave following the liberal egalitarian and libertarian 
ideals, taking into account others’ choice in the first stage (i.e. how much the other 
decided to invest of a sum) when they decided how much to offer.  
 
4.1 Competition  
 
Competition is one of the factors, raised by a two-stage paradigm, which can affect 
offers in the UG and the DG. To the best of my knowledge, Schotter, Weiss and Zapater 
(1996) were the only authors who have so far investigated the role of competition in 
economical UG and DG. They used a “survival pressure” procedure, by embedding 
the two games in a competitive framework, where the decisions made at these games 
had a consequence on the following task. In detail, they built a study with 4 
experimental conditions: 2 conditions entailed the classical version of the one-shot UG 
or DG; in the other 2 conditions, the UG or the DG was inserted in a two-stage 
competition and only the proposers who earned more points in the first stage could pass 
to the second stage. The authors hypothesized that in the two-stage conditions, given 
the “survival pressure”, low offers in the first stage would be perceived as more 
justified by proposers and more acceptable by receivers, compared to conditions in 
which one-stage UG or DG was played. They actually found that only in the DG the 
survival pressure affected the offers in the first stage. Indeed, dictators engaged in a 
two-stage game made lower offer in the first stage, compared to dictators engaged in 
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one-stage DG. On the contrary, in the UG this effect did not reach statistical 
significance, maybe because of the possibility of a rejection. To the authors these 
results were enough to posit that “equity is not an absolute ideal but rather one that is 
defined conditional on the institutional structure in which the agents are placed” 
(Schotter, Weiss and Zapater, 1996, pp. 51). 
 
4.2 Emotions  
 
Emotions are among the most important factors that could affect the decisions in the 
UG and the DG. Many scholars have considered them to explain why the choices made 
in the UG and the DG are very different from the ones predicted by classical theories.  
When we talk about emotions related to decision-making, we usually refer to a 
classification proposed by Loewenstein and Lerner (2003). Based on which phases of 
the decision-making process they arise, the authors divided emotions in two main 
group: expected and immediate emotions. The former are essentially mental 
anticipations of emotional consequences of decision-making. The latter are instead felt 
at the decision time. Immediate emotions are divided then in incidental or integral, 
based on their origin. The incidental emotions are elicited by events preceding the 
decision and are unrelated to its object. The integral emotions instead are elicited by 
the object of the decision itself and are related to it.  
Both kind of immediate emotions could affect decisions in the UG and the DG. Among 
integral emotions, fear of rejection is a factor that explains at least part of fair offers in 
the UG (Fellner and Guth, 2003; van Dijk, De Cremer and Handgraaf, 2004; Ding et 
al., 2004). To the best of my knowledge no studies have directly measured fear of 
rejection: it was instead inferred from different factors. For example, Fellner and Guth 
(2003) and van Dijk, De Cremer and Handgraaf (2004) showed that offers increased in 
function of the receiver’s power (null in the DG and high in the UG), entailing the 
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increase of negative consequences for proposers. Ding and colleagues (2004), as 
already said, came to similar results by using MAO (Minimum Acceptable Offer) 
paradigm.  
On the other hand, it was demonstrated that receivers reject unfair offers mainly 
because of anger towards proposers (Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996; Sanfey et al., 2003; 
van’t Wout et al., 2006). They seem to be willing to renounce to personal payoffs just 
to punish an unjust proposer. Pillutla and Murnigham (1996) showed that, the more the 
receivers perceived proposers’ offers as unfair, the more anger’s levels increased and, 
by consequence, rejection rates increased. Similar results were found by the study of 
Sanfey and colleagues (2003), investigating, at behavioural and cerebral level, 
receivers’ reactions to unfair proposals made by real participants and by the computer 
in the UG. On a behavioural level, the results showed that the more perceived anger 
increased, the more participants were inclined to reject unfair proposals, especially 
when real people made the offers. At the neural level, fMRI showed increased activity 
of the anterior bilateral insula, an area usually associated with negative emotional 
states, such as anger, pain, physical and moral disgust. Also the results obtained by 
Van't Wout and colleagues (2006) go in the same direction. They found that the 
intensity of anger elicited by unfair offers was associated with a high physiological 
activation of the receivers, especially if these offers were made by real proposers, rather 
than by the computer.  
The studies investigating the role of incidental emotions in the UG also seem to show 
that they could influence decisions made by the participants. For example, Harlé and 
Sanfey (2007) have shown that participants, placed in a condition of induced sadness, 
tend to reject more unfair proposals. In the view of the authors, sad participants became 
more pessimistic and, consequently, they tended to focus more on the negative aspects 
of the unfair offers. Andrade and Ariely (2009) also demonstrated that inducing 
incidental anger in receivers lead higher rejection rates and that this effect is enduring 
in time. Moretti and Di Pellegrino (2010) obtained also higher rejection rates in 
receivers to which disgust was caused (through showing pictures), compared to 
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receivers to whom sad and neutral emotions was induced. On the contrary, Bonini et 
al. (2011), by inducing a disgusting smell in a sample of receivers and a neutral smell 
in another sample, found that receivers were more willing to accept unfair offers in the 
former case, compared to the latter. According to the authors, receivers in the “disgust 
condition”, mis-attribute the disgust felt for the unfair offers to the disgusting smell.  
What do not appear very clear yet is how incidental emotions act on decision-making. 
According to the Accommodation/assimilation theory (Forgas, 1995), a positive mood 
makes people more "assimilative" and selfish, that is more focused on personal 
rewards, while a negative mood makes them more oriented towards the surrounding 
environment (more "accommodative") , and therefore more other-regarded. Indeed, 
through four experimental studies conducted with UG and DG, Forgas (2013) showed 
that proposers with a negative mood (induced by using video clip and manipulated 
feedback at a cognitive-spatial task) offered more resources than those with a positive 
mood. Completely opposite are the previsions made by the Mood-maintenance 
hypothesis of Isen (1987, 2008). According to this theory, people with a positive mood 
try to preserve it by making decisions that are consistent with their emotional state, and 
therefore more equitable and socially acceptable, that is fairer offers in the UG, as 
would demonstrate the results obtained by Mellers (2010). 
 
 
5. The studies presented in this thesis 
 
In order to investigate whether previous experiences, lived before to play the UG and 
the DG, could affect proposers’ decisions made at both these games, in the studies 
presented in this thesis a two-stage paradigm was used. Several studies (Hoffman et al., 
1994; Schotter, Weiss and Zapater, 1996; Cherry et al., 2002; Cappelen et al., 2007, 
2010; Bland et al., 2017; Matarazzo et al., 2017) have shown the effectiveness of this 
paradigm to investigate the contextual factors passible to affect participants’ decision-
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making. In detail, in these studies, it was used to test two main questions 
simultaneously: whether particular types of previous experiences can affect offers done 
in the UG and the DG; whether the emotional reaction raised by previous experiences 
can mediate these putative effects.  
Two different kinds of previous experiences were created by means of the games 
presented before the UG or DG: luck games and skill games. In study 1, participants in 
the first stage played a game of luck, through which the initial number of tokens 
provided by the experimenters could be modified. The final amount of tokens had to 
be shared, in the second stage, in the UG or in the DG. In this study, the two stage were 
completely unrelated between them and no explicit final goal was stated.  
In studies 2 and 3, the first stage was composed by three games: two ability tasks and 
a session of the UG or the DG. Through these games participants had to earn the score 
needed to pass to the second stage, for which there was a minimum threshold to reach. 
Participants were falsely informed that they were playing with another player and that 
both of them, one of them or none of them could pass to second stage, the most 
important of the whole experiment The second stage was actually never played. It was 
only mentioned in order to link the decisions made in the first stage with the second 
stage. The results of the ability tasks were manipulated in conformity with the 
experimental conditions of each study. Namely, in study 2 participants were ahead or 
at disadvantage compared to the other player, or were not informed about their score. 
In the first two conditions the proposer’s power was manipulated, while in the third 
condition the offer was made under uncertainty. In the mock second stage participants 
should have increased their score but would have played alone. In this way, 
competitiveness concerned only the first stage.  
 In study 3 participants were always ahead compared to the other player (except than 
in the uncertainty condition, in which no result was communicated) but in one condition 
the other player had reached the threshold for the second stage while in the other 
condition she did not. In this way the receiver’s power in the UG was manipulated. 
However, in order to increase competitiveness, the instructions specified that if a player 
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did not pass to second stage, her score would have been devolved to the other player 
and that if both players reached the second stage, they would have played against each 
other in a zero-sum game.  
In all studies here presented, two groups of emotions were taken into account. They are 
not strictly classifiable as incidental or integral emotions, in the meaning given to the 
terms by Lowenstein and Lerner (2003). Indeed, the first group was only partially 
unrelated to the decisions taken in the UG or the DG. In fact, the experiences that 
should elicit them were separate from the two games, even if the general gaming 
context was the same. Positive and negative emotions were employed to investigate 
whether they were affected by the manipulation of games results and whether they 
mediated the putative effect of such manipulation on the choices in the UG and the DG. 
The second group instead included emotions and beliefs that in literature have been 
associated with the choice made in both games.  
Furthermore, in these, studies, versions of the UG and the DG without money allocation 
were built. Participants were indeed asked to divide tokens (in study 1) and points (in 
studies 2 and 3). To the best of my knowledge, only few studies have investigated 
proposers’ behaviour in non-economic versions of the UG and the DG. Ciampaglia and 
colleagues (2014) and Matarazzo and colleagues (2016) are two of these, and their 
results suggest that proposers’ decisions in these conditions are similar to those found 
in the economic literature.  
Lastly, in the three studies conducted in Italy participants were unpaid volunteers. On 
the contrary, in the replication of the third study, conducted at the Leiden University, 
participants were paid. Possible differences found in results of study 3 and of its 
replication will be considered.  
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CHAPTER 2 
STUDY 1  
 
1. Introduction 
 
As stated before, the sense of fairness, measured through the offers in both the 
Ultimatum Game (UG, Guth et al., 1982) and the Dictator game (DG, Kahneman et al., 
1986; Forsythe et al., 1994), is sensitive to many contextual factors (Frey and Bohnet, 
1995). Some studies have shown that offers in both games can change based on 
previous experiences made in the experimental setting before to play the games. 
Moreover, such experiences can also influence the emotional state in which 
participants arrive to play the UG and the DG, affecting decision-making of both 
proposers and receivers (Harlé and Sanfey, 2007; Andrade and Ariely, 2009; Moretti 
and Di Pellegrino, 2010; Bonini et al., 2011). 
In the classical versions of the UG and the DG, the amount to share between the two 
players was a “free gift” made by the experimenter (Guth et al., 1982; Kahneman et al., 
1986; Forsythe et al., 1994). In this study, instead, the amount to be divided consisted 
in the number of tokens resulting from a game of luck, through which the initial number 
of tokens provided by the experimenter had increased, decreased or remained 
unchanged, depending on the experimental conditions. Does the result of such a game 
affect the choices in the UG and/or the DG?   
To my knowledge, only few studies have investigated this topic. Van Swol and Braun 
(2014) created an experimental design with two condition named “Bonus” and “Not-
bonus”. In the “Not-bonus” condition, participants picked a card from a deck (in which 
all the cards were actually always “8”) and they were told that the equivalent amount 
in dollars would have been the sum to share in a UG session (i.e. always 8$). In the 
“Bonus” condition, after picked a card from a deck (in this condition always “7”), 
participants had to play a single manipulated session of “heads or tails” game, through 
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which they earned always 1$ more. In other words, all participants played the UG with 
8$, but in the “Bonus” condition participants were led to believe they were lucky to 
earn 1$ of that sum. This was enough to make proposers more selfish: indeed they 
offered fewer dollars to receivers (around 5% less) compared to the proposers in the 
“Not-bonus” condition. According to the authors, participants in the “Bonus” condition 
viewed the extra dollar won as resulting from the right choice they had made in the 
coin toss game: consequently, they felt entitled to separate this dollar from the others 
and to keep it for themselves.  
Bland and colleagues (2017) found similar results. In their study, participants were 
paired with an anonymous opponent. They were told that at first both of them had to 
play a simple game, where they had to choose three out of nine yellow ovals presented 
on the screen and to uncover them. If they found a black colour on the uncover side, 
then they earned 3£. On the contrary, if they found a red colour on the uncover side, 
then they earned nothing. Therefore, participants could hypothetically earn from 3£ to 
9£, but actually the outcome was manipulated. Three experimental conditions were 
created: a) the participant earned more than the opponent; b) the opponent earned more 
than the participant; c) both players earned the same. Then the outcomes of both 
participants were added up and this amount became the budget to share in the UG, at 
the second stage. This means that each participant contributed in a different way to the 
sum accumulation. At the second stage, the roles of proposer and receiver were 
randomly assigned. Results showed that the participants who believed to have 
contributed more to the accumulated amount, by earning more in the first stage, were 
less willing to share the sum with the other players, by offering to them between 30% 
and 40% of the total, compared to the 50% proposed in the conditions in which 
participants had contributed less or in the same way. Although in this study explicit 
references to luck were not made, participants were told that they had “won” and not 
“earned” the amount, thus they should not have felt any right on it. Moreover, the task 
used did not entail personal skills and no cognitive effort was done.  
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Taken together, the results of the two studies seem to show that people in a context of 
strategic interactions are willing to accept inequalities in resources’ distribution if these 
inequalities are due to their previous good/bad luck.  
Whether the effect that the previous good/bad luck has on the offers done at both UG 
and DG is mediated by the emotion raised by the previous experience is another 
important issue to disentangle. Several studies have shown that emotional states affect 
decision-making in both games (Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996; Sanfey et al., 2003; 
van’t Wout et al., 2006; Harlé and Sanfey, 2007; Mellers, 2010; Moretti and Di 
Pellegrino, 2010; Forgas, 2010, 2013). However, it has been scarcely investigated 
whether emotions can mediate the effect of experimental manipulation on the choices 
in the UG and the DG.  
To the best of my knowledge, only Matarazzo and colleagues (2017) have examined 
this subject. They built a non-economic version of the UG, where proposers have to 
divide no money but tokens. Through a luck game, their number could increase, 
decrease or remain unchanged, compared to the amount received at the beginning of 
the experiment. The emotional reaction following the experimental manipulation and 
the emotions and beliefs felt during decision-making were self-assessed by participants 
(all proposers) and were considered as potential mediators of the effects exerted by 
experimental conditions. It was found that in the negative outcome condition, proposers 
offered significantly less tokens to their opponent, compared to proposers in the 
unvaried outcome condition (35% vs. 43% of the total amount). No significant 
differences between negative and positive conditions were found, thus suggesting that 
a good luck do not increase generosity. This effect was mediated by the emotions and 
beliefs experienced during decision-making, whereas the emotions felt after the luck 
game exerted a suppression rather than a mediation effect: so, the role of emotion has 
been unclear and needed to be further investigated.   
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2. Aims of the study 
 
This study further investigated the topic discussed in the paper of Matarazzo et al. 
(2017) by using a similar experimental design. Therefore it examined whether:  
- a manipulated result obtained in a card game influenced the decisions of proposers in 
the UG and at the DG, in a similar or different way depending on the game; 
- this effect was mediated by emotions related to the card game and/or by emotions and 
beliefs about the choice. 
The following results were expected:  
1. Regarding the experimental conditions: if participants were willing to share 
their good luck with the opponent, the offers should increase with the 
positive outcome at the card game and decrease with the negative one, 
compared to the condition in which the number of tokens at start and end of 
the card game was the same. If instead the good luck at the card game was 
experienced as own merit and thus participants were not willing to share it, 
the offers should decrease with a positive outcome. If previous game did 
not affect the offers, no differences between the experimental conditions 
should occur. 
2. Regarding the emotions related to the card game and the emotions and 
beliefs related to decision-making in the UG and the DG: both types of 
emotional response should change in function of manipulated outcome and 
should mediate the putative effects of the card game on choices in the UG 
and the DG.  
3. About the games, and therefore regardless of the experimental conditions, 
the offers in the UG, compared to those in the DG, should be higher if 
participants were sensitive to the bargaining power of the other player 
(Straub and Murnighan, 1995; Pillutla and Murninghan, 1995). If instead 
the DG evoked feelings of social responsibility (Greenberg, 1978; van Dijk 
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and Vermunt, 2009), the offers in this game should be higher or similar 
compared to the offers done in the UG.  
 
3. Method 
 
 
3.1.Experimental design 
 
A 2 (game: UG vs. DG) x 3 (outcome: positive, negative or unchanged outcome in a 
luck game) between-subject design was created. The different outcomes were created 
by manipulating the results obtained in a luck game (i.e. a card game) played in the 
first part of the experiment before playing the UG or the DG. To play the card game 
participants received a certain number of tokens at the beginning of the experiment, 
whose amount varied based on conditions. After playing the card game such number 
increased, decreased or remained unchanged. Since the initial number of tokens varied 
in accordance to the conditions, at the end of the card game all participants had the 
same budget to play the UG or the DG.  
 
3.2.Participants  
A total of 300 participants (M=152) took part in the study: 150 participants played the 
Ultimatum Game and 150 played the Dictator Game. They were unpaid volunteers 
students from different Universities of Campania, aged between 18 and 42 years (M= 
22.20; S.D.=3.029). For each game (UG and DG), participants were randomly assigned 
to one of the 6 experimental conditions: positive, negative or unchanged outcome at 
the card game played before the UG or the DG.  
The participants were recruited two at a time, by paying attention on avoiding any 
contact between them, in order to make as anonymous as possible the interaction. After 
27 
 
recruited, they were settled in two near but separate rooms and were told that they 
would interact via Internet. Actually, there was no real interaction between them. 
 
4. Materials and procedure 
 
The experiment was implemented on “E-Prime 2.0” software and was carried out with 
a laptop. Before starting the experiment, participants were asked to read and sign the 
informed consent.  
In the general instructions, participants were informed that the experiment was divided 
into two parts. In the first part, they would have to play a simple card game. In the 
second part, they would have to make a decision, “by interacting with the other 
participant” in the case of the UG, or “that would affect also the other participant” in 
the case of the DG. 
All participants then played the card game with the initial amount of tokens provided 
by the experimenter. It consisted in eight draws from a deck of 40 cards, through which 
they could win or lose a certain amount of tokens. The experimenter actually 
manipulated what appeared like a randomly drawing, in order to build the three 
different outcomes. In “positive outcome”, participants received 10 tokens as initial 
budget and ended the game with 19 tokens. In “negative outcome”, they started with 
40 tokens, and ended the game with 19 tokens. In “unchanged outcome”, the initial and 
final amount was19 tokens (see table 1).  
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Therefore, in all conditions participants ended the card game with 19 tokens. They 
represented the initial budget for the second part of the experiment where participants 
played the UG or the DG.  
In order to investigate whether the experimental manipulation of the outcome in the 
card game affected the emotional state of the participants, they were asked to assess 
the intensity of six emotions (happiness, satisfaction, feeling lucky, sadness, irritation, 
disappointment), before and after playing the card game. Emotions were randomly 
presented on the screen, and participants had to assess them on a 9-point Likert Scale 
(1 = not at all; 9 = extremely). 
Then, half of the sample played a single session of the UG, and the other half played a 
single session of the DG. The role of proposer was seemingly drawn in a random way. 
Actually, all participants played the UG or the DG in this role. All proposers were 
instructed that they had to decide whether and how to divide their available budget (19 
tokens) with the other participant. Proposers were also told that receivers had 
previously executed the same card game even if the outcome was not communicated. 
Then, the specific rules for each game (UG or DG) were given. In detail, participants 
in the UG conditions were told that their opponent could decide to accept or reject their 
offer, and that, in case of rejection, neither player would receive anything. On the 
contrary, the participants in the DG conditions were told that the other participant could 
only accept their offer. Reaction times employed by the participants to make their offer 
were registered. 
After made their offer, all participants were asked to assess, on a 9-point scale (1 = not 
at all; 9 = extremely), the intensity with which they had experienced a set of emotions 
Table 1. Experimental conditions and their related initial and final budget. 
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and beliefs, which in literature were assumed to underlie decision-making about the 
offer. They differed depending on the principal game. In the UG, they were the 
following: sense of fairness, empathy, thinking that it was convenient for the 
responders to accept also poor offers, desire to keep as much as possible of the total 
budget for themselves, fear that a too low offer would be rejected. In the DG emotions 
and beliefs about the choice were: sense of fairness, empathy, desire to keep as much 
as possible of the total budget for themselves, thinking that the responder could only 
be able to accept one’s offer. All items were presented in a random order. After that, 
the experiment ended and participants were debriefed about the real aims of the study 
and thanked. 
In order to test the reliability of the fictional interaction procedure, a pilot study with 
40 participants had been conducted. Participants were specifically asked, after the 
experiment, to evaluate the credibility of the interaction with the other participant. No 
participant doubted about it. 
 
 
5. Results 
 
Manipulation check 
In order to check whether the manipulated outcome given to the card game influenced 
the intensity of emotions self-assessed before and after the card game, a 2 (game: 
Ultimatum/Dictator) x 3 (outcome: unchanged/positive/negative) x 6 (emotions: 
sadness/satisfaction/feeling lucky/joy/disappointment/irritation) x 2 (time: pre/post 
card game) mixed ANCOVA was carried out. Game and outcome were inserted as 
between-subjects variables, whereas emotions and time were settled as within-subject 
variables. Gender was settled as covariate.  
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Results revealed a significant three-way interaction between outcome, emotions and 
time (F=8.435; df= 10,1465; p<.001; pη2=.054), whereas the four way interaction, 
including the game, was not significant. Thus, emotions had a similar trend in time in 
both games. Gender had no effect.  
The simple effect analysis about the three-way interaction revealed that:  
- with the unchanged outcome no emotions changed in a significant way, except for 
irritation that decreased after the card game (p<.01) ;  
- with the positive outcome all emotions differed in a significant way, except for 
sadness. In detail, emotions with a positive valence, i.e. joy (p<.001), satisfaction 
(p<.001), and feeling lucky (p<.001) increased. On the contrary, emotions with a 
negative valence, i.e. irritation (p<.001) and disappointment (p<.01) decreased; 
- with the negative outcome only joy (p<.001) and satisfaction (p<.001) decreased 
significantly.  
In table 2 means (and standard deviations) of the emotions assessed before and after 
the card game were reported.  
Table 2. Means (and standard deviations) of emotions self-assessed before and after card game. 
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Since joy and satisfaction were the only two emotions that changed in both positive 
and negative outcome, they were the only taken into account in the further mediation 
analyses. To this end, the Δ value (i.e. the difference between post and pre values) of 
the two emotions (Δ joy and Δ satisfaction) was calculated. The other emotions were 
no longer considered. 
 
Effect of experimental conditions on Offers   
In the purpose to investigate whether the card-game outcome affected the offers and 
whether this supposed effect was different in the two games (Ultimatum and Dictator), 
a 3 (outcome: unchanged/positive/negative) x 2 (game: Ultimatum/Dictator) between-
subject ANCOVA was conducted, with gender included as covariate, and the offer 
amount settled as dependent variable. 
The results showed no significant main effects but revealed a significant interaction 
between game (UG vs. DG) and outcome (unchanged/positive/negative), F= 13.311; 
df= 2,293; p<.001; pη2=.083. The interaction was examined through a simple effects 
analysis with Bonferroni adjustment for pairwise comparisons. 
In table 3 means of tokens offered for each condition are reported.  
 
 
 
Pairwise comparisons of the games (UG and DG) in function of the outcome 
(unchanged/positive/negative) revealed that: 
Table 3. Means (and s.d.) of tokens offered to the other participant. 
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- in the conditions with unchanged outcome, there was no significant difference 
between the two games (UG and DG) in terms of tokens offered to the other 
participants (p=.290); 
- with a positive outcome, in the DG, proposers gave significantly more tokens to the 
other participant, compared to the UG offers (p<.001);  
- with a negative outcome, in the UG, proposers gave significantly more tokens to the 
receivers, compared to the DG (p<.01). 
If we consider the interaction from another perspective, i.e. comparing the outcomes in 
function of the game, the results show that: 
- in the UG, participants who received a positive outcome offered significantly less 
tokens to the other player, compared to those receiving a negative outcome (p<.001). 
No differences between the unchanged outcome and the other two types of outcome 
were found; 
- in the DG, participants who obtained a positive outcome gave significantly more 
tokens to the receivers, compared to participants obtaining negative or unchanged 
outcomes (both ps<.05), who gave a similar number of tokens.  
Effect of Experimental conditions on reaction times during decision-making 
In order to investigate whether the reaction times employed to decide the offer differed 
depending on experimental conditions, it was conducted a 3 (outcome: 
unchanged/positive/negative) x 2 (game: Ultimatum/Dictator) between-subject 
ANCOVA, with gender included as covariate. The dependent variable was the offers’ 
reaction time.  
Results revealed only a main effect of the game (F= 5.967; df=1,293; p<.05; pη2= .020), 
although the pη2 value was low. In the UG participants taken a little more time to made 
a choice (mean= 38786.6200 sec.; s.d.= 1245.726), compared to the DG (mean= 
34448.8933 sec.; s.d.= 1245.726).                                                                                                  
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Mediation-moderation analysis 
Results of manipulation check showed that the card-game outcome affected only joy 
and satisfaction, whereas no (casual) effect was due to the random assignation of the 
participants to the UG or the DG. Results of ANCOVA showed that offers were 
affected by the interaction between card-game outcome (positive/negative/ unchanged) 
and main game (UG vs. DG), without any main effect of the two independent variables. 
In order to investigate whether the effect of the outcome on offers, which was 
moderated by the type of game, was mediated by changes in joy and satisfaction (i.e. 
Δ joy and Δ satisfaction), a mediation-moderation analysis using the PROCESS 3.1 
macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2018) was performed. The macro uses bootstrapping method 
for estimating indirect effects (i.e. the effect of mediating variables); 95% bias-
corrected confidence intervals were calculated through 5000 bootstrap samples. It has 
been tested a model (model 5) in which the card-game outcome was included as 
independent variable (IV), Δ joy and Δ satisfaction were included as Mediators (Med) 
and the type of game (UG vs. DG) was included as moderator  (Mod). Offers in the 
UG and DG were the dependent variable (DV).  
In figure 1 the model is depicted.  
The multicategorical IV was coded as two dummy variables (Positive outcome = 1; 
other outcomes = 0; Negative outcome = 1; other outcomes = 0) with the unchanged 
outcome acting as reference category. The moderator was coded as one dummy 
variable (1= DG, 0 = UG). Gender was settled as covariate (0=F; 1=M).  
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Figure 1. Conceptual model of mediation-moderation analysis conducted.  
 
In order to ovoid repetitions, I will not report in detail the results similar to those 
already highlighted by the two ANCOVAs, such as effects exerted by outcome on the 
two mediators (Δ joy and Δ satisfaction): compared to unchanged outcome, both 
increased with positive outcome and decreased with negative outcome.  
When all variables (IV, Mod, IVxMod Interaction, Med and covariate) were inserted 
in the regression model to test their direct effect on offers, the significant results were 
the following: compared to unchanged outcome, positive outcome (B=-1.5579; SE= 
.7154; t= -2.1776; p<.05) decreased offers, whereas the interaction positive outcome x 
DG increased them (B=3.4580; SE= .9967; t= 3.4693; p< .001). Δ joy (B=-.3027; SE= 
.1435; t= -2.1093; p<.05) decreased offers. The remaining variables did not exert any 
significant effect. The conditional direct effects of IV on DV, i.e. the effects of outcome 
moderated by the type of main game (UG vs. DG), were similar to those revealed by 
the second ANCOVA: compared to unchanged outcome, with a positive outcome, in 
the UG offers decreased (B=-1.5579; SE= .7154;t= -2.1776; p<.05), whereas in the DG 
increased (B=1.9001; SE= .7083;t= 2.6828;p<.01). The effect of negative outcome did 
not reach the level of significance. However, negative outcome exerted an indirect 
effect on offers through Δ joy (B=.1877; BootSE= .1172; BootLLCI= .0029; 
BootULCI= .4576), which thus exerted a mediation effect. More specifically, negative 
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outcome decreased Δ joy, which in turn decreased offers: so the indirect effect was 
positive.  
Since the “emotions and beliefs about the choice” were different in the two games, two 
different mediation analyses were conducted (one for each game).  
Mediation analysis for the UG 
The mediation analysis was conducted by using the PROCESS 3.1 macro for SPSS 
(Hayes, 2018). For this analysis only the data concerning the UG were considered: 
consequently, the selected model (model 4) tested whether outcome (IV) affected 
offers in the UG (DV) and whether this effect was mediated by emotions and beliefs 
about the choice, self-assessed by participants after offer (Med). Gender was 
introduced in the model as covariate (M=1; F=0). The multicategorical independent 
variable (outcome) was coded as two dummy variables (Positive outcome = 1; negative 
condition = 0 / Negative outcome = 1; positive condition = 0) with unchanged outcome 
as reference category. Putative mediators were: Desire to keep available budget as 
much as possible; Empathy; Thinking that it would have been convenient to the other 
participant to accept any offer; Sense of justice; Fear that an offer too advantageous 
for his/herself would have been rejected by the other participant. 
Regarding the effect of IV on the putative mediators, results revealed that, compared 
to unchanged outcome, in positive outcome the self-assessed intensity of “Empathy” 
was lower (B= -.9200; SE= .4411; t= -2.0856; p=.0388), while in negative outcome 
“Desire to keep available budget as much as possible” (B= -1.0946; SE= .5134; t= -
2.1318; p<.05) and “Thinking that it would have been convenient to the other 
participant to accept any offer” (B= -1.6506; SE= .5405; t= -3.0539; p<.05) were lower. 
“Sense of justice” and “Fear that an offer too advantageous for his/herself would have 
been rejected by the other participant” were not affected by the outcome manipulation. 
No effect was exerted by gender. 
The total effect (i.e. the overall effect exerted by IV on DV both directly and through 
Med) of outcome manipulation was the following: compared to unchanged outcome, 
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positive outcome decreased offers (B=-1.660;SE=.6700;t=-2.4778;p<.05), while 
negative outcome increased them (B=1.4823;SE=.6700;t=2.2122;p<.05). Gender did 
not exert any effect. 
When outcome, mediators and covariate were all inserted in the model, in order to test 
their direct effect on offers, results were the following: “Desire to keep available budget 
as much as possible” decreased offers (B= -.5997; SE= .1051; t= -5.7049; p<.001); on 
the contrary, “Sense of justice” (B= .2854; SE= .1144; t= 2.4951; p<.05) and “Fear that 
an offer too advantageous for his/herself would have been rejected by the other 
participant” (B= .2381; SE= .1065; t= 2.2350; p<.05) increased offers. The effect of 
both positive and negative outcomes was no longer significant. However, only negative 
outcome exerted a positive indirect effect on offers through “Desire to keep available 
budget as much as possible” (B= .6564; BootSE= .3427; BootLLCI = .0569; 
BootULCI=1.4061). In detail, negative outcome diminished the intensity of this 
mediator, which in turn exerted a negative effect on offers by diminishing them. The 
multiplication of these double negative effects resulted in a positive effect. In other 
words, receiving a negative outcome in the card game increased offers in the UG 
because decreased the selfish desire for appropriation. Sense of justice and fear of 
rejection increased offers but this effect did not depend on manipulated outcome.  
 
Mediation analysis for the DG 
Also this analysis was conducted by means of PROCESS 3.1 macro for SPSS (Hayes, 
2018). In this case only the data concerning the DG were considered. The procedure 
was the same previously described but the putative mediators were slightly different:  
Desire to keep available budget as much as possible; Empathy; Sense of justice; 
Thinking that the responder could only be able to accept one’s offer. 
 Results showed that negative outcome made to increase “Sense of justice” (B= 1.0419; 
SE= .5019; t= 2.0759; p<.05) and “Empathy” (B=.9370; SE= .4563; t= 2.0534; p<.05). 
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No other mediators were influenced by the experimental manipulation. The analysis of 
the total effects of experimental conditions on offers revealed that only positive 
outcome had a significant effect on offers (B= 1.8308; SE=.7442; t= 2.4601; p<.05) by 
increasing them. When the direct effects of both IV and mediators were calculated, the 
effect of positive outcome was still significant (B= 2.0816; SE=.7181; t= 2.8987; 
p<.05), whereas, among the putative mediators, only “Desire to keep available budget 
as much as possible” affected offers by decreasing them (B= -.5296; SE= .1299; t= -
4.0769; p<.001). So, there was no indirect effect. The emotions and beliefs taken into 
account did not mediate the effect of positive outcome on offers. Those affected by the 
experimental manipulation (empathy and sense of justice) did not affect offers, while 
the desire for appropriateness affected offers independently from the experimental 
manipulation. Gender never affected results. 
 
6. Discussion  
 
The study presented here has investigated whether a previous experience (a card game 
whose outcomes were manipulated) affected the offers in the UG and in the DG and 
whether this effect was mediated by emotions related to the card game and/or emotions 
and beliefs about the choice.  
First of all, results revealed that a manipulated outcome given to a simple card game 
was able to affect the emotional state of participants in an intuitive way. This effect 
was stronger with positive outcome condition where the emotions with a positive 
valence increased and those with a negative valence decreased. Instead, in negative 
outcome condition, the effect was weaker: only joy and satisfaction decreased. With 
unchanged outcome, also emotions tend to remain unchanged: only irritation 
decreased, maybe because the card game was quite relaxing. 
Regarding the effect of experimental conditions on offers, results revealed that the 
manipulated outcome of the card game affected the offers both in the UG and the DG, 
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but in an opposite way in the two games as a function of the bargaining power of the 
receiver. Namely, with a positive outcome, in the DG, proposers gave significantly 
more tokens to the other participant, compared to offers in the UG (37% vs. 22% of 
total budget, respectively). The opposite effect was found with a negative outcome: in 
the UG proposers made higher offers, compared to those made in the DG (about 40% 
vs. 27%. of total budget, respectively). In other words, when participants were lucky   
and receivers had no possibility to oppose to their choices (i.e. in the DG), they made 
more generous offers, compared to a situation in which receivers had a decision power 
(the UG). On the contrary, when the other has a strategic power (i.e. in the UG), 
thinking of having been unlucky leads proposers to make higher offers, perhaps in order 
to avoid other losses (such as in case of a rejection). In the unchanged outcome 
condition, no differences between offers done in the two games were found: they were 
around 30% of total budget. 
It is noteworthy that receivers were supposed to have already a number of tokens, 
because they too had played the card game.  
These findings suggest a general tendency to fairness, which becomes particularly 
relevant in the DG, where the offer corresponds to a gift. This result appears even 
stronger if we consider that the dictators had no information about the receivers’ 
outcome in the card game. 
As already said, Matarazzo and colleagues (2017) conducted a study with a procedure 
very similar to the one used in the present study, even if the DG was not included in 
the design. Moreover, in their study, participants were told that receivers had performed 
a cognitive task before the UG, and that, consequently, they did not have any personal 
budget. They found that, after receiving a negative outcome in the card game, proposers 
in the UG offered significantly less tokens to their opponent. On the contrary, in this 
study, higher offers in the UG were observed. Since the main difference between the 
procedures used in the two studies was about the opponent’s budget, the different 
results were probably due to this factor. It could be hypothesized indeed that proposers 
in the Matarazzo’s study thought that the receivers, not having a personal budget, were 
39 
 
more willing to accept low offers in order to earn at least something. On the contrary, 
in the present study proposers probably were more scared about the possibility of a 
rejection that they considered more likely, since receivers had already a personal 
budget.  
Regarding the second main aim of the study, namely investigating whether the effect 
of the experimental conditions was mediated by the emotions related to the card-game 
and by the emotions and beliefs related to decision-making in the UG and the DG, 
results showed that this happened only partially. Regarding the emotions related to the 
card-game, only Δ joy mediated the effect of the negative outcome condition. However, 
the finding that the increase of joy produces a decrease of offers is congruent with the 
predictions of the Accommodation/assimilation theory (Forgas, 1995) according to 
which people in a positive mood make more selfish choices. Among emotions and 
beliefs related to the decision-making only the “Desire to keep as much as possible of 
the total budget for themselves” mediated the effect of negative outcome in the UG, 
whereas no effect were found for the DG.  
Lastly, the analysis on the reaction times employed by the participants to make their 
offer revealed that these were higher in the UG, compared to the DG. Although this 
effect was very low, it was probably due to the strategic component present in the UG, 
which involved a greater reflection on the sum to offer to the receivers. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Study 2 
1. Introduction 
 
In the first study, it was shown that the results obtained in a simple luck game 
affected the offers done at both the UG and the DG. In this study a two-stage 
paradigm was used: in the first stage, there was a game of luck, while in the second 
stage participants played the UG or the DG. 
In the studies 2 and 3, and in the replication of the third study, described in this 
chapter, also a two-stage paradigm was used, but the following modifications were 
introduced: the luck game was substituted by two cognitive tasks; in the first stage 
participants had to obtain the score needed for reaching the second stage, by 
performing the cognitive tasks and the UG or the DG; the second stage was 
fictitious but was presented as the most important of the entire experiment. Finally, 
all the tasks of the first stage were placed in a general competitive framework, 
absent in the first study. Study 2 and 3 differed each other for the level of 
competitiveness, higher in study 3.  
In the literature, numerous studies showed that proposers who believed to have 
been more deserving in ability tasks compared to their opponent, thus earning the 
role of proposer, behave in a more selfish way (Hoffman et al., 1994; Cherry et al., 
2002; Cappelen et al., 2007, 2010).  
Hoffman and colleagues (1994) demonstrated that when participants earned the 
right to be in the role of proposers lower offers were observed, compared to when 
the role of proposer was randomly assigned. In detail, in their study there were two 
ways to assign the role of proposer: a “contest assignment treatment” and a 
“random assignment treatment”. In the “contest assignment treatment”, 12 
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participants had to answer to a current events questionnaire. For each correct 
answer, participants earned money and the firsts six participants who earned more 
money earned the right to become proposers in the UG or in the DG. In the “random 
assignment treatment”, the role of proposer was casually assigned. Results revealed 
that in the UG, less than 45% of the participants who earned the role of proposers 
offered 4$ out of 10$ to the receivers, whereas in the “random assignment 
treatment” more than 85% gave 4$ or more. Moreover, in the “contest assignment 
treatment” only 4% of proposers in the DG offered 4$ to the other participant, and 
nobody offered 5$. The authors attributed these differences to an increased sense 
of right felt by the proposers who earned the role through their ability. 
In the study of Cherry and colleagues (2002), dictators earned through a quiz the 
amount to divide with the receiver, who did not do the quiz and thus had not any 
personal budget. The experiment entailed two stages. In the first stage, named 
money-earning session, dictators had to do a quiz composed of 17 questions taken 
from the GMAT (Graduate Management Admission Test), through which they 
could earn 40$ (if they correctly answered at least 10 questions out of 17) or 10 $ 
(if they correctly answered less than 10 questions). In the second stage, named 
bargaining session, proposers were randomly paired with anonymous receivers, 
with whom they had to play the DG. The authors compared the results obtained in 
three different experimental conditions: a) the “baseline” treatment, in which no 
“money-earning session” was entailed, such as in the classical version of the DG; 
b) the “earnings” treatment, in which proposers had to do the quiz, while receivers 
did nothing, and then both played the DG; c) the “double-blind with earnings”, 
identical to the “earnings” treatment, except for the fact that offers were completely 
anonymous: indeed they were written on a paper, inserted in a box and then 
randomly draw by the receivers. Results revealed that the percentages of dictators 
who offered zero were: - 15-19% in the “baseline” treatment; - 70-79%in the 
“earnings” treatment; - 95-97% in the “double-blind with earnings” treatment. 
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Therefore, according to the authors, legitimizing wealth with effort makes altruism 
an exception and the self-interest a rule.  
Always by using a two-stages paradigm, Cappelen and colleagues (2007, 2010) 
created two experiments in which the first stage consisted in a “production phase” 
and the second stage in a “distribution phase” (namely a session of the DG). In the 
2007 study the production phase consisted in deciding how much to invest of a 
given sum of money (0, 100 or 200 out of 300 NOK, Norwegian crown) by 
knowing that such investment could allow doubling or quadrupling the initial 
amount. Instead, in the 2010 study in the production phase participants had to 
perform a task (i.e. to type a text on the computer). The “value of production” (i.e. 
how much it was earned in this phase) for each participant depended on three 
factors: working time, productivity (how many correct words they typed in 1 
minute), and price (the amount of money for each correct word, which was 
randomly assigned between two possible amounts). In the consequent distribution 
phase, participants had to play the DG, in the role of both proposers of receivers. 
Before playing the DG, proposers were informed about the amount earned by the 
other participants in the production phase. According to the authors, results of both 
studies demonstrated that, in deciding how much to give to receivers, a crucial role 
was played by the distinction between the factors that were or not under the 
receivers' control. Results of the first experiment indeed showed that, apart from 
those who offered nothing or half of the amount regardless of the situation, the 
majority of dictators cared about the others’ type of investment in deciding how 
much to offer them. Indeed, most of participants offered a sum in line with what 
receivers had produced on the basis of their skills (factor under personal control) 
or a sum able to decrease the inequalities due to bad luck (factor not under personal 
control). Moreover, in the 2010 study, the authors found that dictators modulated 
their offers based on working time and productivity (i.e. factors under personal 
control) and not on the price (randomly assigned).  
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Therefore, in all the studies reported so far it was demonstrated that the more the 
participants felt that they were more deserving than the other player, the more they 
were reluctant to share their amount with him/her. However, in all these studies, 
the experiment ended after the decision made in the UG or the DG. To the best of 
my knowledge, Schotter, Weiss and Zapater (1996) were the only scholars who 
embedded the UG and the DG in a competitive framework. As I wrote in the first 
chapter, they created a “survival pressure” procedure, where the decisions made in 
the UG and DG had consequences on the following task. They found that only in 
the DG the survival pressure affected the offers in the first stage. Indeed, dictators 
engaged in a two-stage game made lower offer in the first stage, compared to 
dictators engaged in one-stage DG.  
In the studies reported in this chapter, a two-stage paradigm was used in which 
worthiness and competitiveness were inserted. The goods to be divided in the UG 
and DG were not of economic nature, but consisted in points to be earned trough 
ability tasks. The worthiness was manipulated through fake feedbacks (positive or 
negative) given to these tasks. In all these studies a similar basic procedure was 
used. In the first stage participants had to play three games: two cognitive skill 
games and the UG or the DG. Through these games, they could accumulate points 
to pass to the second stage, for reaching which a minimum threshold had to be 
achieved. Actually the second stage did not exist, since its only function was to 
generate a competitive context in the first stage, where the UG and the DG were 
played.  
The differences between the specific procedures will be reported in the description 
of each study.  
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2. Aims of the study 
In the present study it was investigated whether:  
- being in an advantageous or disadvantageous position compared to the other 
participant (by having gained more or less points than his/her, in cognitive-ability 
tasks whose results had been manipulated) affected the offers in the UG and in the 
DG, in a competitive context; 
- this putative effect was mediated by emotions related to the ability tasks and/or 
by emotions and beliefs about the choice. 
The following results were expected: 
1. Regarding the manipulation of the results in cognitive-ability tasks: if more 
deserving participants behaved more selfishly, the participants who received a 
positive manipulated feedback in the two ability tasks (and thus were in ahead 
compared their opponent) should offer fewer points to the receiver, compared 
to the remaining participants (i.e. those with a negative feedback and those 
without feedback). If instead participants with a higher score were more willing 
to help the needy, those receiving a positive feedback should make higher 
offers. On the contrary, if the results to previous tasks did not affect decision-
making, similar offers in the three experimental conditions should be observed; 
2. Regarding the games (UG and DG): if participants were sensitive to the 
bargaining power of the other player (Straub and Murnighan, 1995; Pillutla and 
Murninghan, 1995), the offers in the UG should be higher, compared to those 
in the DG. If on the contrary the receivers’ powerlessness in the DG evoked 
feelings of social responsibility (Greenberg, 1978; van Dijk and Vermunt, 
2009), the offers in this game should be higher, compared to the offers done in 
the UG.  
3. About the emotions related to the cognitive-ability tasks and the emotions and 
beliefs related to decision-making in the UG and the DG: both types of 
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emotional response should change in function of manipulated outcome and 
should mediate the putative effects of the ability tasks on choices in the UG and 
the DG.  
 
3. Method 
 
3.1. Experimental design 
 
A 2 (main game: UG/DG) x 3 (feedback: positive /negative /absent) between-
subject design was created. The different feedbacks were created by manipulating 
the results obtained by both participants in two cognitive-ability tasks played before 
playing the UG or the DG. Therefore, participants could play the UG or the DG: 
by being in an advantageous position compared to the opponent; by being in a 
disadvantageous position compared to the opponent; by knowing neither their own 
results, nor those of the opponent. 
 
3.2.  Participants 
A total of 333 participants (M=148) took part in the study: 168 participants played 
the Ultimatum Game (56 for each of the three experimental conditions) and 165 
played the Dictator Game (56 for each of the three experimental conditions, less 3 
participants in the positive condition since they did not finish the experiment). They 
were students from different Universities of Campania, unpaid volunteers, aged 
between 18 and 30 years (M= 22,11; S.D.=2,715). Each participant was randomly 
assigned to one of the 6 experimental conditions: positive, negative and absent 
feedback for the UG and positive, negative and absent feedback for the DG. 
However, they were paired by gender.  
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The participants were recruited two at a time, by paying attention on avoiding the 
contact between them, in order to make as anonymous as possible the interaction. 
After recruited, they were settled in two near but separate rooms and they were told 
that they would interact via Internet. Actually, there was no real interaction between 
them.  
 
4. Materials and procedure 
 
The experiment was implemented on “E-Prime 2.0” software and was carried out 
with a laptop. Before starting the experiment, participants were asked to read and 
sign the informed consent.  
General instructions informed participants that the main aim of the experiment was 
to investigate how people behave when they have to pursue a goal and that the 
experiment was divided into two stages, in both of them the two participants would 
be connected each other via Internet. In the first stage, they had to play three games, 
two decision tasks, and one cognitive task, through which they had to reach at least 
8 point in order to pass to second stage.  Participants were also informed that in the 
second stage they would play alone, and that they should increase their score as 
much as possible through a series of cognitive tasks. Actually, the second stage was 
never really played and the experiment ended after the third task of the first stage 
(i.e. after the UG or the DG). Finally, instructions told participants that during the 
experiment they should assess the intensity of a number of emotional states because 
one of the aims of the study was to investigate whether they would change during 
the experiment.  
The experiment started by asking participants to assess, on a 9-point Likert Scale 
(1 = not at all; 9 = extremely), the intensity of six emotions (contentment, 
satisfaction, self-confidence, frustration, irritation, sorrow), randomly presented. 
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Emotions were again assessed after the two tasks of cognitive ability, in order to 
evaluate whether they were affected by the manipulated result to such tasks.  
After that, participants were asked to perform a decision task, with a single item, 
for which 4 points were available according to this rule: if only one player answered 
correctly, she would earn 4 points; if both players answered correctly, they both 
would earn 2 points; if no player answered correctly, nobody would earn anything. 
Results were manipulated and both players, regardless of their answer, earned 2 
points.    
Then, participants were told that, for the second game, the program would 
randomly draw one between two types of tasks: a cognitive and a perceptive task. 
Actually, participants received always the cognitive task, whereas the mock 
opponent received the fictitious perceptive task. The task consisted in 8 items drew 
from the SCAT (Short Cognitive Ability Task), created ad hoc by Matarazzo and 
colleagues (2015) with the aim to make the feedback manipulation believable. 
Indeed, the task was quite demanding and it was hard for participants to guess if 
their answers were right or wrong. For each item, participants had 30 seconds to 
answer and they were told that if they did not answer a question in time, the 
program would register a random response. This allowed avoiding that participants 
assigned to the positive feedback condition had a high score although they did not 
answer every question.  For this task, two points for each correct answer were 
given. Therefore, participants could hypothetically earn 16 points: actually, those 
receiving a positive feedback were told that they had answered correctly 7 trials up 
8 (thus gaining 14 points), whereas those receiving a negative feedback were told 
that they had answered correctly 1trial up 8 (thus gaining 2 points).  
After receiving their results, participants were also informed about those of their 
opponent: participants assigned to the positive feedback condition were informed 
that the opponent had earned 4 points, whereas those assigned to the negative 
feedback condition were informed that the opponent had earned 12 points. 
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In the absent feedback condition no results were communicated after the two tasks.  
In table 1 the scores obtained by participants in all experimental conditions are 
reported. 
 
Table 1. Manipulated results obtained by participants in the two first game of the first stage. 
Participants played all in the role of Participant A. 
 
 
After played the first two games of the first stage, participants self-assessed the 
same six emotions assessed at the beginning of the experiment. Then, half of 
participants played the UG and the other half played the DG. All participants played 
in the role of proposers. Both games were presented as a decision task in which one 
player, named proposer, had to decide how to divide 10 further points with the 
receiver, who had the power to refuse in the UG (by leaving in this way the scores 
unvaried), while had no power in the DG. It is worthy to note that, since 8 points 
was the minimum threshold to pass to the second stage, in the positive feedback 
condition participants had 8 points more than the threshold, whereas the opponent 
needed two points to reach it; on the contrary, in the negative feedback condition 
participants needed 4 points for reaching the threshold, whereas the opponent had 
obtained 6 points more than the threshold.  
Finally, after making their offer in the UG or the DG, all participants were asked to 
assess, on a 9-point scale (1 = not at all; 9 = extremely), the intensity with which 
they had experienced a set of emotions and beliefs that in literature were assumed 
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to underlie decision-making about the offer. They differed depending on the 
principal game. In the UG they were the following: sense of fairness, empathy, 
thinking that it was convenient for the responders to accept also poor offers, desire 
to keep as many points as possible, Fear that an offer too advantageous for 
his/herself would have been rejected by the other participant. In the DG emotions 
and beliefs about the choice were: sense of fairness, empathy, desire to keep as 
many points as possible, thinking that the responder could only be able to accept 
one’s offer. They were all presented in a random order. After that, the experiment 
ended and participants were debriefed about the real aims of the study and thanked. 
 
5. Results 
 
Manipulation check 
In order to check whether the manipulated outcome given to the ability tasks 
influenced the intensity of emotions self-assessed before and after the two ability 
tasks, a 2 (game: Ultimatum/Dictator) x 3 (feedback: absent/positive/negative) x 6 
(emotions: contentment /sorrow /self-confidence /frustration /irritation 
/satisfaction) x 2 (time: pre/post ability tasks) mixed ANCOVA was carried out. 
Game and conditions were inserted as between-subjects variables, whereas 
emotions and time were settled as within-subject variables. Gender was settled as 
covariate.  
Results revealed a significant three-way interaction between feedback, emotions 
and time, F=16.482; df=10,1630; p<.001; pη2=.203. On the contrary, the four-way 
interaction, including the game, was not significant. Thus, emotions had a similar 
trend in time in both games. Gender had no effect.  
The interaction was examined through a simple effects analysis with Bonferroni 
adjustment for multiple comparisons. Results revealed that:  
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- with absent feedback, contentment (p<.01), self-confidence (p<.001) and 
satisfaction (p<.001) decreased after the two ability tasks, whereas sorrow (p<.05), 
frustration (p<.001) and irritation (p<.001) increased;  
- with positive feedback emotions with a positive valence, i.e. contentment 
(p<.001), satisfaction (p<.001) and self-confidence (p<.001), increased. On the 
contrary, emotions with a negative valence, i.e. irritation (p<.01), sorrow (p<.01) 
and frustration (p<.05), decreased; 
- with negative feedback all the emotions changed in a significant way, except for 
frustration. Contentment (p<.001), self-confidence (p<.001) and satisfaction 
(p<.001) decreased. Sorrow (p<.001) and irritation (p<.05) increased.  
In table 2 means (and standard deviations) of the emotions self-assessed before and 
after the ability tasks are reported. 
Table 2. Means (and s.d.) of emotions self-assessed before and after the ability tasks  
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Since all emotions changed in a significant way in all the experimental conditions, 
except for frustration that did not change with negative feedback, the Δ value (i.e. 
the difference between post and pre values) of the remaining 5 emotions was 
calculated. These values were the only taken into account in the further mediation 
analyses.  
Effect of experimental conditions on Offers   
In Table 3 means of points offered for each experimental condition are reported. 
With the purpose of investigating whether the experimental conditions affected the 
offers, a 2 (game: Ultimatum/Dictator) x 3 (feedback: absent/positive/negative) 
ANCOVA was carried out, with gender included as covariate, and the offer amount 
settled as dependent variable. 
A main effect of each independent variable was found, whereas their interaction 
was not significant. Gender had no effect. 
Table 3. Means of points (and standard deviations) offered by proposers in each experimental 
conditions.  
 
The main effect of game (F=16.330; df = 1,326; p<.001; pη2=.048) revealed that in 
the UG proposers offered more points to the receiver than in the DG. The main 
effect of feedback  (F=10.553; df = 2,326; p<.001; pη2=.061), examined through 
pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment, revealed that with negative 
feedback proposers offered significantly less points compared to absent feedback 
(p<.001) and to positive feedback (p<.05), which did not differ each other.  
Effect of experimental conditions on reaction times during decision-making 
A 3 (conditions: absent/positive/negative outcomes) X 2 (game: 
Ultimatum/Dictator) ANCOVA was conducted, in order to investigate whether the 
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reaction times employed to decide the offer were different depending on 
experimental conditions, with gender included as covariate. Results revealed no 
significant effects of the IV on reaction times.  
Mediation analysis 
Results of manipulation check showed that the task feedback affected almost all 
emotions (except frustration), and that no (casual) effect was due to the random 
assignation of the participants to the UG or the DG. Results of ANCOVA on offers 
showed that feedback and game affected offers independently of each other. Thus, 
a mediation analysis was performed to investigate whether the effect of the 
feedback on offers was mediated by the change in emotions, by using the 
PROCESS 3.1 macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2018). The macro uses bootstrapping 
method for estimating indirect effects (i.e. the effect of mediating variables); 95% 
bias-corrected confidence intervals were calculated through 5000 bootstrap 
samples. It has been tested the model 4 in which the card-game outcome was 
included as independent variable (IV), and Δ contentment, Δ sorrow, Δ self-
confidence, Δ irritation, Δ satisfaction were included as Mediators (Med). Offers in 
the UG and DG were the dependent variable (DV). The multicategorical IV was 
coded as two dummy variables (Positive feedback = 1; other feedbacks = 0; 
Negative feedback = 1; other feedbacks = 0) with the absent feedback acting as 
reference category. Gender was settled as covariate (M=1; F=0).   
Regarding the effects that feedback exerted on putative mediators, results were 
similar to those found in the manipulation check and are not reported here. Also the 
total effect of the IV on the DV was the same as the ANCOVA: compared to the 
reference category, with negative feedback offers decreased, where there was no 
significant difference between the reference category and positive feedback. 
However, when all variables were introduced in the model to test their direct effect 
on the DV, no effect of the putative mediators and no indirect effect of the IV 
through mediators were found.   
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Since the “emotions and beliefs about the choice” were different in the two games, 
two different mediation analyses were conducted (one for each game).  
Mediation analysis for the UG 
Also this analysis was conducted by using the PROCESS 3.1 macro (model 4) for 
SPSS (Hayes, 2018). However, only the data concerning the UG were considered: 
thus the model tested whether feedback (IV) affected offers in the UG (DV) and 
whether this effect was mediated by emotions and beliefs about the choice, self-
assessed by participants after offer (Med). Gender was introduced in the model as 
covariate. The five putative mediators were: Fear that an offer too advantageous 
for his/herself  would have been rejected by the other participant; desire to keep as 
many points as possible; Empathy; Thinking that it would have been convenient to 
the other participant to accept any offer; Sense of justice. 
Regarding the effect of the IV on putative mediators, results revealed that, 
compared the reference category, desire to keep as many points as possible 
increased in both positive (B=1.2447; SE=.4938; t=2.5206; p<.05) and negative 
(B=1.2125; SE=.4944; t=2.4523; p<.05) feedbacks, as well as Thinking that it 
would have been convenient to the other participant to accept any offer 
(B=1.3587;SE=.5149;t=2.6387;p<.01 for positive feedback; B=1.5656; SE=.5156; 
t=3.0366; p<.01 for negative feedback). On the contrary, Sense of justice decreased 
in both positive (B= -.9024; SE= .4208; t= -2.1443; p<.05) and negative (B= -
1.6441; SE= .4214; t= -3.9015; p<.01) feedbacks. The remaining two putative 
mediators were not affected by feedback.  
The total effect of feedback manipulation was the following: compared to absent 
feedback, negative outcome decreased offers (B=-.8253;SE=.2896;t=-
2.8502;p<.01), while positive outcome did not differ significantly. Gender did not 
exert any effect.  
When all variables (IV, Med and covariate) were inserted in the regression model 
to test their direct effect on offers, results revealed that the effect of negative 
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feedback was no longer significant. Among the putative mediators, Fear that an 
offer too advantageous for his/herself would have been rejected by the other 
participant increased offers (B= .1222; SE= .0453; t= 2.6962; p<.01) whereas 
desire to keep as many points as possible decreased them. (B=-.2216; SE=.0461; 
t=-4.8076; p<.001).  
The effect of negative feedback on offers in UG was therefore mediated by desire 
to keep as many points as possible (B= -.2687; BootSE= .1312; BootLLCI = -.5678; 
BootULCI = -.0544). In detail, negative feedback increased the intensity of this 
mediator, which in turn exerted a negative effect on offers by diminishing them. 
The multiplication of these effects resulted in a negative effect. In other words, 
receiving a negative feedback after the two ability tasks decreased offers in the UG 
because increased the desire to preserve as many points as possible.  
Mediation analysis for the DG 
Also this analysis was conducted by using the PROCESS 3.1 macro (model 4) for 
SPSS (Hayes, 2018). Only the data concerning the DG were considered: the model 
tested whether feedback (IV) affected offers in the DG (DV) and whether this effect 
was mediated by emotions and beliefs about the choice (Med.). Gender was 
introduced in the model as covariate. The four putative mediators were: desire to 
keep as many points as possible; Empathy; Sense of justice; Thinking that the 
responder could only be able to accept one’s offer. 
Regarding the effect of the IV on putative mediators, results showed that, compared 
to the reference category, only desire to keep as many points as possible increased 
in both the positive (B=1.0763; SE=.5295; t=2.0329; p<.05) and the negative 
(B=1.2770; SE=.5222; t=2.4454; p<.05) feedbacks. The other three putative 
mediators were not affected by feedback.  
The analysis of the total effects of the IV on the offers revealed that only negative 
feedback decreased the offers (B= -1.3947; SE= .3872; t=-3.6021; p<.001), while 
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positive feedback did not differ significantly from the reference category. Gender 
did not exert any effect.   
When all variables (IV, Med and covariate) were inserted in the regression model 
to test their direct effect on offers, the effect of negative feedback was still but less 
significant (B=-.8864; SE=.3408; t= 2.6005; p<.05). Among the putative mediators 
desire to keep as many points as possible (B= -.3247; SE= .0589; t= -5.5142; 
p<.001) decreased offers.  
The effect of negative feedback on offers in DG was therefore partially mediated 
by desire to keep as many points as possible (B=-.4147; BootSE=.1861; 
BootLLCI=.8065; BootULCI=-.0768). In detail, negative feedback increased the 
intensity of this mediator, which in turn exerted a negative effect on offers by 
diminishing them. The multiplication of these effects resulted in a negative effect. 
In other words, receiving a negative feedback after the two ability tasks decreased 
offers in the DG because increased the desire to preserve as many points as possible. 
 
6.  Discussion   
 
The study presented here had the main aims to investigate whether being in an 
advantageous or disadvantageous position compared to the their opponent, in a 
competitive context, affected the offers in the UG and the DG and whether this 
effect was mediated by emotions related to the ability tasks and/or by emotions and 
beliefs about the choice.  
Results revealed that the two experimental conditions affected the offers 
independently of each other. In detail, regarding the game, in the UG proposers 
gave significantly more points to the receivers compared to the DG. Thus, proposers 
seemed to be sensitive to the bargaining power of the other participant (Straub and 
Murnighan, 1995; Pillutla and Murninghan, 1995). However, also in this study, 
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proposers in the DG offered more than the 30% of the total amount to the 
powerlessness receiver, by confirming other-regarding concerns highlighted in 
literature (Forsythe et al., 1994; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Charness and Rabin, 
2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Holt and Laury, 2008). 
Regarding the conditions, negative feedback led participants to offer less points to 
their opponent compared to the positive and absent feedback. In fact, proposers who 
received a negative feedback believed they had earned only 4 points at the ability 
tasks and they knew that the minimum threshold to pass to the second stage was 8 
points. Therefore, they kept enough points to pass to the second part of the 
experiment. On the contrary, in the positive feedback condition, even if proposers 
had the power to offer nothing (or very few, if they made a strategic choice in the 
UG) to the other, thus increasing their advantage, they decided to be benevolent 
and to help the needy receivers sharing almost fairly with them the amount of 
points. In the absent feedback condition then, where participants di not have any 
reference point about their position in the game, their offers did not differ from 
those of the participants with positive feedback. Overall, these results were very 
similar to those found in literature (see Camerer, 2003 or Güth and Kocher, 2014 
for a review) by confirming a general tendency to fairness where no other factors 
were taken into account. On the contrary, these results are not in line with those 
studies (Hoffman et al., 1994; Cherry et al., 2002; Cappelen et al., 2007, 2010) in 
which more worthy proposers made more selfish offers. 
Regarding the second main aim of the study, namely investigating whether the 
effect of the experimental conditions was mediated by the emotions related to the 
ability tasks and the emotions and beliefs related to decision-making in the UG and 
the DG, results showed that this happened only partially. Although the emotions 
related to the ability tasks were affected by the experimental conditions, they did 
not exert any mediation effect on the offers. Regarding the emotions and beliefs 
about the choice, only “desire to keep as many points as possible” mediated the 
effect of the negative feedback condition, completely in the UG and only partially 
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in the DG. However, in both games, negative feedback led participants to feel more 
“desire to keep as many points as possible” that in turn led the offers to decrease. 
In other words, more “desire to keep as many points as possible” is felt with 
negative feedback, more offers decrease.  
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Study 3 
 
 
1. Aims of the study 
As already said, in study 3, compared to study 2, two main factors have been 
changed, although the general structure of the experiment was the same: the degree 
of competitiveness and the position in the game of participants compared to their 
opponents. The competitiveness was increased introducing a new rule in the two-
stage paradigm, according to which if only one participant reached the stage 2, then 
she would obtain all the points of the other participant, who instead would finish 
the experiment at the end of the stage 1. Furthermore, the manipulation of the game 
position of the two participants, through false feedback to cognitive-ability tasks, 
was the following: our participants were always ahead compared to opponents 
(except for the uncertainty condition, in which the results were not communicated). 
However, the score of opponents varied as a function of experimental manipulation. 
In detail, in a type of condition, they had already reached the minimum threshold 
needed to pass to the second stage; in another condition, they had not reached the 
threshold yet. In the third condition, as already said, the results were not 
communicated. 
Therefore, in the present study it was investigated whether:  
- in a competitive two-stage paradigm, the offers in the UG and in the DG were 
affected by the possibility (present, absent or uncertain, according with the 
manipulated scores of players) to obtain the points of the other player if the 
latter failed to reach the minimum threshold needed to pass to the second stage  
- in such paradigm the difference between the UG and the DG in terms of 
bargaining power of receivers was effaced when in the UG receivers had failed 
to reach the threshold and could reach it only if proposers would donate them 
the needed points;  
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- these putative effects were mediated by emotions related to the ability tasks 
and/or by emotions and beliefs about the choice. 
The following results were expected:   
- Regarding the manipulation of the results in cognitive-ability tasks and thus the 
position in the game of the players: since our participants were always in a 
position of clear advantage compared to opponents (except for the uncertainty 
condition), it was supposed that the receivers’ position was the relevant factor 
driving the offers. More specifically, in the UG it has been created a condition 
in which receivers had no bargaining power, analogously to what happens in all 
DG conditions. Namely, when the threshold had not been reached yet, receivers 
had no decisional power, for two reasons: any offer could help them to pass to 
the second stage (except for offer=1); if they rejected the offer, and thus did not 
pass to the second stage, all their points would be given to proposers. On the 
contrary, when the threshold had been reached, receivers had power to decide 
whether accept or not the offers. Consequently, in the UG, it was expected the 
following findings: if proposers would take gain from the receivers’ 
powerlessness when the threshold had not reached, lower offers in this 
condition should be observed, compared to offers made in threshold reached 
and uncertainty conditions (where receivers had bargaining power). If instead 
the powerless position of the opponent evoked feelings of social responsibility, 
higher offers in this condition should be observed. Finally, if the results to 
previous tasks did not affect decision-making, similar offers in the three 
experimental conditions should be observed. Regarding the DG, where 
receivers are always powerless, in accordance with some studies reported in 
literature (Greenberg, 1978; van Dijk and Vermunt, 2009) highlighting that 
receivers’ powerlessness evoked feelings of social responsibility, it was 
expected that offers would be higher in the case in which receivers were 
needier, i.e. when they had not reached the threshold yet.  
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- About the emotions elicited by the ability tasks and the emotions and beliefs 
about the choice: both type of emotional reactions should be affected by 
experimental conditions and should mediate their putative effect on choices in 
the UG and the DG. 
 
 
2. Method 
2.1 Experimental design 
A 2 (main game: UG/DG) x 3 (receiver’s position: uncertain/threshold reached 
/threshold not reached) between-subject design was created. The different 
conditions were created by manipulating the scores obtained by both participants 
in two cognitive-ability tasks played before playing the UG or the DG. Therefore, 
participants could play the UG or the DG: by being in an advantageous position 
compared to the opponent who already had reached the minimum threshold needed 
to pass to the second stage (threshold reached); by being in an advantageous 
position compared to the opponent who had not reached yet the minimum threshold 
needed to pass to the second stage (threshold not reached); by knowing neither 
their own results, nor those of the opponent (uncertain position). For the sake of 
brevity, I have named “receiver’s position” this variable, but it should be specified 
that our participants were always in ahead, compared to the opponents, and that the 
condition of uncertainty concerned both proposers and receivers. 
 
2.2 Participants 
A total of 240 unpaid volunteers participated (M=110) in the study: 120 participants 
played the Ultimatum Game (40 for each of the three experimental conditions) and 
120 played the Dictator Game (40 for each of the three experimental conditions). 
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They were students from different Universities of Campania, aged between 18 and 
44 years (M= 22,25; S.D.=3,000). The recruitment procedure was the same used in 
study 2. Also in the present study, each participant was randomly assigned to one 
of the six experimental conditions. 
 
3. Materials and procedure 
 
Materials and procedure were almost the same employed in study 2. Therefore, in 
order to avoid repetitions, only the modifications made will be illustrated. Once 
again, the experiment was implemented on “E-Prime 2.0” software and was carried 
out with a laptop.  
General instructions informed participants that the main aim of the experiment was 
to investigate how people behave when they have to pursue a goal and that the 
experiment was divided into two stages, in both of them the two participants would 
be connected each other via Internet. In the first stage, they had to play three games, 
two decision tasks, and one cognitive task, through which they had to reach at least 
17 points in a condition or 19 points in the other condition, in order to pass to the 
second stage. In the second stage, contrary to study 2, they should play a zero-sum 
game against the other participant, but only if both participants reached the 
minimum threshold. Otherwise, if only one participant reached the second stage, 
she would obtain all points of the other. If no participant reached the second stage, 
the experiment would end after the first stage. The second stage was actually never 
played and the experiment ended after the third task of the first stage (i.e. UG or 
DG). Finally, instructions told participants that during the experiment they should 
assess the intensity of a number of emotional states because one of the aims of the 
study was to investigate whether they would change during the experiment. 
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The experiment started by asking participants to assess, on a 9-point Likert Scale 
(1 = not at all; 9 = extremely), the intensity of six emotions (contentment, 
satisfaction, self-confidence, frustration, irritation, sorrow), randomly presented. 
Emotions were again assessed after the two tasks of cognitive ability, in order to 
evaluate whether they were affected by the manipulated result to such tasks.  
After that, participants were asked to perform a decision task, similar to that used 
in study 2. Results were manipulated and both players, regardless of their answer, 
earned 2 points.    
Then, participants were told that, for the second game a cognitive task consisting 
of both cognitive and perceptive trials had to be played. The cognitive trials were 
extracted by the SCAT (already described in previous study), with the exception 
that in this study, 3 points for each correct answer were given. The perceptive trials 
consisted in 4 items of the “Find the differences” game. Also for this game, 3 points 
for each correct answer were given. Therefore, participants in this second game 
could hypothetically earn 24 points. In both “threshold reached” and “threshold not 
reached” conditions, through manipulation of the results, our participants earned 
the maximum (by answering correctly to 8 trials up to 8), while their opponents 
earned only 15 points (by answering correctly to 5 trials up to 8). Participants were 
also informed about their opponent’s results. Therefore participants’ scores after 
the two games were: 26 points for our participants vs. 17 points accumulated by the 
opponents. Consequently, in the condition in which the threshold had been fixed to 
17 points, opponents reached it; in the condition in which the threshold had been 
fixed to 19 points, opponents did not reach it yet. In the uncertainty condition, no 
results were communicated.  
In table 1 the scores obtained by participants in the three conditions are reported.  
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  Table 1. Manipulated results obtained by participants in the three conditions. Participants played all in the 
role of Participant A.  
 
After playing the first two games, participants self-assessed the same six emotions 
assessed at the beginning of the experiment. Then, half of participants played the 
UG and the other half played the DG. All participants played in the role of 
proposers. Both games were presented as a decision task in which one player, 
named proposer, had to decide whether and how to divide 13 further points with 
the other player, named   receiver, who had the power to refuse in the UG (by 
leaving in this way the scores unvaried), while had no power in the DG.  
Finally, after making their offer in the UG or the DG, all participants were asked to 
assess, on a 9-point scale (1 = not at all; 9 = extremely), the intensity of the same 
emotions and beliefs already used in study 2. After that, the experiment ended and 
participants were debriefed about the real aims of the study and thanked. 
 
4. Results 
 
Manipulation check 
In order to check whether the manipulated feedback given to the ability tasks 
influenced the intensity of emotions self-assessed before and after the tasks, a 2 
(game: Ultimatum/Dictator) x 3 (receiver’s position: uncertain/threshold reached 
/threshold not reached) x 6 (emotions: contentment /sorrow /self-confidence 
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/frustration /irritation /satisfaction) x 2 (time: pre/post ability tasks) mixed 
ANCOVA was carried out. Game and conditions were inserted as between-subjects 
variables, whereas emotions and time were settled as within-subject variables. 
Gender was settled as covariate.  
Results revealed a significant three-way interaction between conditions, emotions 
and time, F=5.361; df=2,233; p<.001; pη2=.104. Instead, the four-way interaction, 
including the game, was not significant. Thus, emotions had a similar trend in time 
in both games. Gender had no effect.  
The interaction was examined through a simple effects analysis with Bonferroni 
adjustment for multiple comparisons. Results revealed that:  
- in the uncertainty condition, contentment (p<.001) and self-confidence (p<.05) 
decreased after the two ability tasks, whereas frustration (p<.01) and irritation 
(p<.01) increased. Satisfaction and sorrow did not differ in a significant way;  
- in the threshold reached condition, only satisfaction (p<.01) increased in a 
significant way. No other change was found. 
- in the threshold not reached  condition, all emotions changed in a significant way. 
Namely, emotions with a positive valence, i.e. contentment (p<.001), self-
confidence (p<.001) and satisfaction (p<.001), increased. Sorrow (p<.05), 
frustration (p<.01) and irritation (p<.05) decreased.  
In table 2 means (and standard deviations) of the emotions self-assessed before and 
after the ability tasks are reported. 
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Table 2. Means (and standard deviation) of emotions self-assessed before and after the ability tasks.  
 
Since only satisfaction changed in a significant way in all experimental conditions, 
the Δ value (i.e. the difference between post and pre values) of this emotion was 
calculated and this value was the only taken into account in the further mediation 
analyses.  
 
Effect of experimental conditions on Offers   
With the aim to investigate whether the experimental conditions affected the offers, 
a 2 (game: Ultimatum/Dictator) x 3 (receiver’s position: uncertain/ threshold 
reached /threshold not reached) ANCOVA was carried out, with gender included 
as covariate, and the offer amount settled as dependent variable. 
The results showed no significant main effects but revealed a significant interaction 
between game and receiver’s position, F= 7.017; df= 2,233; p<.01; pη2=.057. The 
interaction was examined through a simple effects analysis with Bonferroni 
adjustment for multiple comparisons. Gender had no effect. 
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In the table 3 means and standard deviations of points offered by participants are 
reported. 
Table 3. Mean of points (and standard deviations) offered by proposers in each experimental 
conditions.  
 
Pairwise comparison of the game in function of the receiver’s position revealed 
that: 
- regarding the uncertainty condition, there was no significant difference between 
the two games (UG and DG) in terms of points offered to the other participants 
(p=.894); 
- when receivers had reached the threshold, in the UG proposers offered 
significantly more points to them, compared to the DG offers (p<.05); 
- when receivers had not reached the threshold, in the UG proposers offered 
significantly less points to them, compared to DG (p<.01). 
If we consider the interaction from another perspective, i.e. comparing the 
conditions in function of the game, the results showed that: 
- in the UG, when receivers had not reached the threshold, proposers offered 
significantly less points to them, compared to those offered when receivers had 
reached the threshold (p<.05) and in the uncertainty condition (p<.01); 
- on the contrary in the DG no differences in terms of offers in the different 
conditions were found. 
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Effect of experimental conditions on reaction times during decision-making  
In order to investigate whether the reaction times employed to decide offer were 
different depending on experimental conditions, a 2 (game: Ultimatum/Dictator) x 
3 (receivers’ position: uncertain/ threshold reached/ not reached/) ANCOVA was 
conducted, with gender included as covariate. The dependent variable was the 
offers’ reaction time.  
Results revealed no significant effects of the IV on the reaction times.  
 
Mediation-moderation analysis 
Results of manipulation check showed that after the manipulated results to the two 
cognitive-ability tasks, only satisfaction changed in all experimental conditions and 
that no (casual) effect was due to the random assignation of the participants to the 
UG or the DG. Results of ANCOVA showed that offers were affected by the 
interaction between receiver’s position (uncertain/threshold reached/threshold not 
reached) and main game (UG vs. DG), without any main effect of the two 
independent variables. In order to investigate whether the effect of the experimental 
manipulation on offers, which was moderated by the type of game, was mediated 
by changes in satisfaction (i.e. Δ satisfaction), a mediation-moderation analysis 
using the PROCESS 3.1 macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2018) was performed. It has been 
tested the model 5, following the same procedure used in the first study. However, 
results showed that Δ satisfaction exerted no direct or mediation effect on offers. 
Since the “emotions and beliefs about the choice” were different in the two games, 
two different mediation analyses were conducted (one for each game).  
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Mediation analysis for the UG 
In order to investigate whether the effect exerted by the experimental manipulation 
on the offer in the UG was mediated by emotions and beliefs about the choice, a 
mediation analysis was conducted by using the PROCESS 3.1 macro (model 4) for 
SPSS (Hayes, 2018). The receiver’s position, coded as two dummy variables 
(Threshold reached = 1; threshold not reached = 0 / Threshold not reached = 1; 
threshold reached = 0) with the uncertainty condition as reference category, was 
included as IV. The offer made in the UG was the dependent variable (DV). The 
five emotions and beliefs about the choice (Fear that an offer too advantageous for 
his/herself  would have been rejected by the other participant; desire to keep as 
many points as possible; Empathy; Thinking that it would have been convenient to 
the other participant to accept any offer; Sense of justice) were inserted in the 
model as putative mediators. Gender was included as covariate. 
Regarding the effect of the IV on the putative mediators, results revealed that the 
only putative mediator affected by experimental manipulation was desire to keep 
as many points as possible, which increased when the other participant had not 
reached the threshold yet (B=1.9547; SE=.5938; t=3.2918; p<.01). 
The total effect of experimental manipulation was the following: compared to 
reference category, the condition in which receiver had not reached the threshold 
yet decreased offers (B=-1.6558; SE=.5230; t=-3.1662; p<.05), whereas the 
condition in which the threshold had been reached did not differ from reference 
category. Gender did not exert any effect. 
When all variables (IV, Med and covariate) were inserted in the regression model 
to test their direct effect on offers, results revealed that the total effect of “threshold 
not reached” was no longer significant (B=-.7812;SE=.4794;t=-1.6295;p>.05), 
whereas desire to keep as many points as possible had a negative direct effect on 
offers (B= -.3472; SE= .0775; t= -4.4771; p<.01) by decreasing them, and thus  
suggesting  a mediation effect. Indeed, “threshold not reached” exerted a negative 
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indirect effect on offers through such mediator (B= -.6786; BootSE= .2630; 
BootLLCI = -1.2417; BootULCI= -.2115). In detail, “threshold not reached” 
increased the intensity of the desire for appropriation, which in turn diminished 
offers. The multiplication of these opposite effects resulted in a negative effect.  
 
Mediation analysis for the DG 
Also this analysis was conducted by means of PROCESS 3.1 (model 4) macro for 
SPSS (Hayes, 2018). In this case only the data concerning the DG were considered. 
The procedure was the same previously described but the putative mediators were 
slightly different: desire to keep as many points as possible; Empathy; Sense of 
justice; Thinking that the responder could only be able to accept one’s offer.   
No conditions affected the putative mediators.  
The total effect of experimental manipulation was the following: compared to 
reference category, the condition in which receiver had already reached the 
threshold decreased offers (B=-1.2481;SE=.5923;t=-2.1681;p<.05), whereas the 
condition in which the threshold had not been reached yet did not differ from 
reference category. Gender did not exert any effect. 
When all variables (IV, Med and covariate) were inserted in the regression model 
to test their direct effect on offers, results revealed that the effect of “threshold 
reached” was still significant (B=-1.2669;SE=.5015;t=-2.5263;p<.05). Moreover 
desire to keep as many points as possible decreased offers (B=-.3933;SE=.0809;t=-
4.8588;p<.0001), whereas Empathy increased them (B=.1957; SE=.0946; 
t=2.0683; p<.05). However, these effects were exerted regardless of experimental 
manipulation. Indeed, no indirect effect was found. 
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5. Discussion   
 
The second study presented in this chapter had two main aims: (i) to investigate 
whether, in a competitive two-stage paradigm, the offers in the UG and in the DG were 
affected by the possibility to obtain the points of the other player if the latter failed to 
reach the minimum threshold needed to pass to the second stage; (ii) to investigate 
whether in such paradigm the difference between the UG and the DG in terms of 
bargaining power of receivers was effaced when in the UG receivers had failed to reach 
the threshold and could reach it only if proposers would donate them the needed points.  
Moreover, it was investigated whether these supposed effects were mediated by 
emotions related to the ability tasks and/or by emotions and beliefs about the choice.  
Results revealed an interaction between receivers’ position and main games (i.e. UG 
and DG). In detail, in the uncertainty conditions, no differences between the UG and 
the DG were found. In these conditions, proposers offered around 40% of the amount 
to the receivers, regardless their bargaining power, showing that when no reference 
point about their position in the game was given, a general tendency towards fairness 
was revealed (see Camerer, 2003 or Güth and Kocher, 2014 for a review). Moreover, 
these results were also in line with the results obtained in the absent feedback condition 
in the second study of this thesis. 
Regarding the condition in which receivers had reached the threshold to pass to the 
second stage of the experiment, proposers offered significantly more points in the UG 
compared to the DG.  On the contrary, when the threshold had not reached yet, the 
games had an opposite effect: the UG decreased the offers compared to the DG. Thus, 
if the other participant had a bargaining power (i.e. in the threshold reached condition 
at the UG) higher offers were observed. Probably this effect was due to by the 
proposers’ anticipation of the possibility that receiver, having already reached the 
second stage, could be more willing to reject unfair offers.  
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On the contrary, when the other participant did not reach yet the threshold, the two 
games had an opposite effect. In the UG proposers were more selfish by offering fewer 
points to receivers: probably they relied on the receivers’ necessity to obtain at least 
two points to pass to the second stage. However, although giving less, proposers 
allowed their opponents to pass to the second stage. These results in fact seem to 
confirm the view according to which the UG evoked strategic concerns (Straub and 
Murnighan, 1995; Pillutla and Murninghan, 1995, 2003; van Dijk, De Cremer and 
Handgraaf, 2004; Ding et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2017). This is also evident by the 
mediation effect exerted by “threshold not reached” on offers through “desire to keep 
as many points as possible”. Namely, more desire to keep points was felt in this 
condition, lower offers were observed.   
In the DG, the powerlessness of the needy receivers evoked feelings of social 
responsibility in the proposers (Greenberg, 1978; van Dijk and Vermunt, 2009), who 
made generous offers. This effect represents a strong evidence in favour of the altruism 
elicited by the other powerlessness. In a context of competitiveness the dictators could 
take advantage by the other powerlessness by not allowing her to pass to the second 
stage in order to keep all her points and did not do so, acting as a “benevolent dictator” 
(van Dijk and Vermunt, 2009). These results were thus not in line with the results 
obtained by Schotter, Weiss and Zapater (1996), where dictators in the first stage made 
lower offers to the powerless receivers, keeping more for themselves in order to pass 
to the second stage.    
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Study 4 
Replication of study 3 at the Leiden University 
 
1. Aims of the study 
 
In this session, the replication of the study 3 carried out at the Leiden University, 
under the supervision of Prof. Eric van Dijk, was described. The present study was 
identical to study 3 conducted in Italy and described in the previous session, with 
only the following differences: in this study, participants, before to take part in our 
experiment, were involved in another study, executed in the same laboratory; - 
participants were paid volunteers, whereas in Italy they were unpaid volunteers.  
The first reason driving this replication was to further investigate the result, 
observed in Study 3, for which in the DG higher offers were observed when the 
other participant was needy. This result echoes those of Study 1, in which luckier 
proposers in the DG gave more tokens to the other participant, while in the UG the 
opposite result was observed. Although the “benevolent dictator” is a well-
documented phenomenon in literature (see for example van Dijk and Vermunt, 
1999), with the Italian sample this result was particularly evident. Therefore, the 
replication of Study 3 conducted in Holland, by using the same experimental design 
used in Italy (except for the reimbursement for participation, not entailed in Italy), 
was carried out in order to examine whether the generosity of Italian “dictators” 
was due to specific experimental manipulation or was a specific feature of Italian 
sample.  
The other goals underlying this study were the same of study 3. Therefore, it aimed 
at investigating whether:   
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- in a competitive two-stage paradigm, the offers in the UG and in the DG were 
affected by the possibility (present, absent or uncertain, according with the 
manipulated scores of players) to obtain the points of the other player if the latter 
failed to reach the minimum threshold needed to pass to the second stage  
- in such paradigm the difference between the UG and the DG in terms of 
bargaining power of receivers was effaced when in the UG receivers had failed to 
reach the threshold and could reach it only if proposers would donate them the 
needed points;  
- these putative effects were mediated by emotions related to the ability tasks 
and/or by emotions and beliefs about the choice. 
2. Method 
2.1 Experimental design  
The experimental design and the hypotheses were the same of study 3, described in 
the previous session of the work.  
2.2 Participants 
A total of 240 participants (F=174) took part in the study, but only 219 were taken 
into account for the analyses, since twenty-one participants did not correctly 
complete the experiment, by giving partial or unintelligible answers. 117 
participants were in the UG sample (39 for the uncertainty condition; 38 for the 
threshold reached condition; 40 for the threshold not reached condition) and 102 
were in the DG sample (33 for the uncertainty condition; 35 for the threshold 
reached condition; 34 for the threshold not reached condition). They were students 
from the Leiden university, aged between 17 and 60 years (M= 21.81; S.D.=4.115). 
Participants were recruited by the experimenter in several faculties of Leiden. They 
were informed about the research topic and about main features of the experiment. 
If they accepted to take part in the study, an appointment was defined.  
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3.  Materials and procedure 
 
Materials and procedures used were the same employed in study 3.  Also for this 
study, the experiment was implemented on “E-Prime 2.0” software and was carried 
out on a desktop computer in private rooms designed for the experiment.  
 
4. Results 
 
Manipulation check 
With the aim to test whether the manipulated feedback given to the ability tasks 
influenced the intensity of emotions self-assessed before and after the tasks, a 2 
(game: Ultimatum/Dictator) x 3 (receivers’ position: uncertain/ threshold reached/ 
not reached/) x 6 (emotions: contentment /sorrow /self-confidence /frustration 
/irritation/ satisfaction) x 2 (time: pre/post ability tasks) mixed ANCOVA was 
carried out. Game and conditions were inserted as between-subjects variables, 
whereas emotions and time were settled as within-subject variables. Gender was 
settled as covariate.  
Results revealed a significant three-way interaction between conditions, emotions 
and time, F=7.092; df=10,1060; p<.001; pη2=.145. On the contrary, the four-way 
interaction, including the game, was not significant. Thus, emotions had a similar 
trend in time in both games. Gender had no effect.  
The interaction was examined through a simple effects analysis with Bonferroni 
adjustment for pairwise comparisons. Results revealed that:  
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- in the uncertainty condition, contentment (p<.001), satisfaction (p<.01) and self-
confidence (p<.001) decreased after the two ability tasks, whereas frustration 
(p<.001) and irritation (p<.001) increased. Sorrow did not differ in a significant 
way;  
- in the threshold reached condition, only frustration (p<.01) and satisfaction 
(p<.001) increased in a significant way. All the other emotions did not differ in a 
significant way; 
- in the threshold not reached condition, the emotions with a positive valence, i.e. 
contentment (p<.01), self-confidence (p<.001) and satisfaction (p<.001), increased. 
On the contrary, emotions with a negative valence did not differ in a significant 
way.  
In table 1 means (and standard deviations) of the emotions self-assessed before and 
after the ability tasks are reported. 
Table 1. Means (and s.d.) of emotions self-assessed before and after the cognitive-ability tasks.  
 
Since only satisfaction changed in a significant way in all the experimental 
conditions, the Δ value of this emotion was calculated and was the only taken into 
account in the further analyses.  
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Effect of experimental conditions on Offers   
 
In Table 2 means of points offered for each experimental condition are reported. In 
order to investigate whether the experimental conditions affected offers, a 2 (game: 
Ultimatum/Dictator) x 3 (receivers’ position: uncertain/ threshold reached/ 
threshold not reached) ANCOVA was conducted, with the offer amount settled as 
dependent variable. Gender was included as covariate.  
Two main effects of both independent variables were found. On the contrary, the 
interaction effect was not significant. Gender had no effect. 
 
Table 2. Means of points (and s.d.) offered by proposers in each experimental condition. 
 
The main effect of game (F=10.998; df=1,212; p<.01; pη2=.049) revealed that in 
the UG, proposers offered significantly more points (p<.01) compared to the DG. 
The main effect of condition (F=8.836; df=2,212; p<.001; pη2=.077), examined 
trough pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction, showed that in threshold 
not reached condition, proposers offered significantly less points compared to the 
threshold reached condition and to the uncertainty condition (both ps<.001).  
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Effect of experimental conditions on reaction times during decision-making 
 
A 2 (game: Ultimatum/Dictator) x 3 (receivers’ position: uncertain/ threshold 
reached/ not reached) ANCOVA was conducted, in order to investigate whether the 
reaction times employed to decide offer were different depending on experimental 
conditions, with gender included as covariate.  
Results revealed a main effect of game (F=8.239; df= 1,212; p<.01; pη2=.037): in 
the UG, participants employed more time to decide compared to the DG (p<.05).   
 
Mediation analyses 
 
Results of manipulation check showed that the experimental manipulation of the 
results obtained by participants at the ability tasks affected only satisfaction, and 
that no (casual) effect was due to the random assignation of the participants to the 
UG or the DG. Results of ANCOVA on offers showed that receivers’ position 
(uncertain/ threshold reached/ not reached) and game affected offers independently 
of each other. Thus, a mediation analysis was performed to investigate whether the 
effect of receiver’s position on offers was mediated by the change in satisfaction, 
by using the PROCESS 3.1 macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2018). It has been tested the 
model 4 in which receiver’s position was included as independent variable (IV), Δ 
satisfaction was included as Mediator (Med), and Offer in the UG and DG was the 
dependent variable (DV). The multicategorical IV was coded as two dummy 
variables (Threshold reached = 1; threshold not reached = 0; Threshold not reached 
= 1; threshold reached = 0) with the uncertainty condition acting as reference 
category. Gender was settled as covariate (M=1; F=0).   
Regarding the effects that conditions exerted on Δ satisfaction, results were similar 
to those found in the manipulation check: compared to the uncertainty condition, Δ 
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satisfaction increased in both remaining conditions. Also the total effect of the IV 
on the DV was the same as the ANCOVA: compared to the reference category, in 
“threshold not reached” offers decreased, where there was no significant difference 
between the reference category and “threshold reached”. However, when all 
variables were introduced in the model to test their direct effect on the DV, no effect 
of Δ satisfaction and no indirect effect of the IV through Δ satisfaction were found.   
Since the “emotions and beliefs about the choice” were different in the two games, 
two different mediation analyses were conducted (one for each game).  
 
Mediation analysis for the UG 
Also this analysis was conducted by using the PROCESS 3.1 macro (model 4) for 
SPSS (Hayes, 2018). However, only the data concerning the UG were considered: 
thus the model tested whether condition (IV) affected offers in the UG (DV) and 
whether this effect was mediated by emotions and beliefs about the choice, self-
assessed by participants after offer (Med). Gender was introduced in the model as 
covariate. The five putative mediators were: Fear that an offer too advantageous 
for his/herself  would have been rejected by the other participant; desire to keep as 
many points as possible; Empathy; Thinking that it would have been convenient to 
the other participant to accept any offer; Sense of justice. 
Regarding the effect of the IV on the putative mediators, results revealed that only 
Fear that an offer too advantageous for his/herself  would have been rejected by 
the other participant decreased when the threshold had not been reached (B=-
2.1775; SE=.5971; t=-3.6468; p<.01). No other putative mediators were affected 
by conditions.  
The total effect of receiver’s position was the following: compared to uncertainty 
condition, “threshold not reached” decreased offers (B=-1.5843;SE=.4720;t=-
3.3568;p<.01). On the contrary, “threshold reached” did not differ from the 
uncertainty condition. Gender did not exert any effect. 
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When all variables (IV, Med and covariate) were inserted in the regression model 
to test their direct effect on offers, results revealed that the total effect of “threshold 
not reached” was still but less significant (B=-.9144; SE=.3954; t=-2.3128; p<.05). 
The desire to keep as many points as possible had a negative direct effect on the 
offers (B= -.2535; SE=.0618; t= -4.1035; p<.001) by decreasing them. On the 
contrary, Fear that an offer too advantageous for his/herself would have been 
rejected by the other participant (B= .2033; SE=.0596; t= 3.4114; p<.001), 
Empathy (B=.1506; SE=.0722; t= 2.0863; p<.05) and Sense of justice (B=.1751; 
SE=.0656; t= 2.6706; p<.01) led offers to increase. 
The effect of “threshold not reached” in the UG was therefore partially mediated 
by Fear that an offer too advantageous for his/herself would have been rejected by 
the other participant (B= -.4426; BootSE= .2175; BootLLCI = -.9286; 
BootULCI=-.0949). In detail, this mediator, which decreased when receivers had 
not reached the threshold, exerted a positive effect on offers by increasing them. 
The multiplication of these effects resulted in a negative effect. In other words, the 
condition in which receivers failed to reach the threshold decreased offers in the 
UG because decreased the fear of a rejection. 
 
Mediation analysis for the DG 
The same mediation analysis was conducted for the DG, by inserting the specific 
emotions and beliefs about the choice used for this game (desire to keep as many 
points as possible; Empathy; Sense of justice; Thinking that the responder could 
only be able to accept one’s offer).   
Only “threshold reached” affected Thinking that the responder could only be able 
to accept one’s offer (B=-1.9328; SE=.5770; t=-3.3498; p<.01), by decreasing it. 
All the other mediators were not affected by receiver’s position. 
No total effects of the IV were found.  
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When all variables (IV, Med and covariate) were inserted in the regression model 
to test their direct effect on offers desire to keep as many points as possible 
decreased offers (B=-.3567; =.0997;t =-3.5794; p<.001) and Sense of justice 
increased them (B=.2976; SE=.1081; t=2.7518; p<.01). However, these effects 
were exerted regardless of experimental manipulation. Indeed, no indirect effect 
was found.  
 
5. Discussion 
In the replication of the third study conducted at the Leiden University, the main aim 
was to further investigate whether the generosity of the dictators’ offers when receivers 
were needy was due to the specific experimental manipulation or to a peculiar feature 
of our sample.  
 Results revealed that, compared to the results obtained in Study 3, no interaction effect 
between the two IV (i.e. games and receivers’ position) was found. On the contrary, 
two main effects were revealed. Regarding the game, proposers in the UG offered 
significantly more points to the receivers compared to the dictators. However, also in 
this study, dictators offered more than the 30% of the total amount to powerless 
receivers, by showing once again other-regarding concerns found in literature 
(Forsythe et al., 1994; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann 
and Strobel, 2004; Holt and Laury, 2008).  
About the receivers’ position, results revealed that when receivers had not reached the 
threshold to pass to second stage, proposers offered them fewer points compared to the 
two other experimental conditions, both in the UG and in the DG. Furthermore, 
“dictators” in this condition gave the fewest points than all other participants, although 
this value did not reach the significance level. Thus, the peculiar result found with the 
Italian sample was not replicated with the Dutch sample.   
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Indeed, in the UG, both Dutch and Italian sample seem to be sensible to bargaining 
power of receiver, by offering fewer points when such power is lower or absent. On 
the contrary, in the DG, where structurally receivers are always powerless, the two 
samples seem to have decided based on two opposite criteria: merit and need. Dutch 
participants have perhaps given less because they believed that receivers were 
responsible for the low score obtained; Italian participants have maybe given more 
because they perceived the receivers as being clearly at a disadvantage compared to 
them and more in need of being helped.  
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General discussion 
 
The main aim of this thesis was to examine the issue of fairness in strategic interactions. 
More specifically, the research here presented investigated whether previous 
“experiences” could affect decisions in strategic games, such as the UG and the DG, 
built in not economical versions. To this aim, the UG and the DG were inserted in a 
two-stage paradigm in which previous “experiences”, lived in the first stage, entailed 
luck game or cognitive ability tasks. Moreover, in studies 2 and 3 it was introduced an 
ever-increasing competitiveness between the two players, by making victory at the 
whole game more and more important. Furthermore, it was investigated whether the 
hypothesized effect of the previous experiences was mediated by the emotional 
reaction elicited by such experiences and/or by emotions and beliefs strictly related to 
decisions.  
First of all, results showed that the not economical versions of the UG and the DG were 
effective. Indeed, in all studies, participants were steeped in the experimental context, 
displaying an intrinsic motivation to participate in, even if money was not involved. 
Moreover, the experimental manipulation has always produced effects on offers in both 
the UG and the DG, in ways consistent with the expected results. In addition, 
participants in the debriefing session always declared a subjective involvement. As 
already said, to the best of my knowledge, only a few studies have previously 
investigated proposers’ behaviour in not economical version of the UG (Ciampaglia et 
al., 2014; Matarazzo et al., 2016). In the study of Ciampaglia and colleagues (2014), 
proposers had to divide a workload with their opponent, while in the study of 
Matarazzo and colleagues (2016) the object of division consisted of symbolic tokens. 
In all studies presented here, tokens or points had to be divided and, when the UG was 
played, similar offers were observed. Taken together, these studies showed results 
similar to those found with the economic versions of the UG (see Camerer, 2003 or 
Güth and Kocher, 2014 for a review). To the best of my knowledge, no studies 
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investigated proposers’ behaviour in not economic versions of the DG. In the studies 
presented in this thesis, also the results obtained with this game were in line with the 
results obtained in the economic version of the DG (see Camerer, 2003 or Güth and 
Kocher, 2014 for a review). 
From a theoretical point of view, the general tendency of people towards fairness, 
documented in the literature (Forsythe et al., 1994; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Charness 
and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Holt and Laury, 2008) was found also 
in the studies presented here. Proposers indeed always offered something, in both the 
UG and the DG, even if in some experimental conditions keeping all tokens or points 
for themselves would have represented a huge personal advantage without entailing 
any negative consequences for themselves (see for example the results obtained in the 
condition in which the other participant was needier in Study 3). Nevertheless, the two-
stage paradigm (Schotter, Weiss and Zapater, 1996; Matarazzo et al., 2016; Bland et 
al., 2017) has revealed that both types of previous “experiences” lived in the first stage 
(i.e. luck game or ability tasks), whose results were manipulated, have been effective 
in influencing proposers’ behaviour. Thus, despite a general tendency towards fairness, 
people adjust their behaviour in function of contextual factors, such as luck, worthiness 
or personal position in the played game (Frey and Bohnet, 1995).  
The role of both types of emotional reactions (i.e. the emotions related to the 
games/tasks performed in the first-stage and the emotions and beliefs related to the 
decisions made in the UG or the DG) has been less influential than expected. The 
former emotions, although influenced by the experimental conditions, scarcely affected 
offers and rarely mediated the effect of the experimental conditions on offers. Indeed, 
only in study 1, changes in joy mediated the effect of a negative outcome on the offers. 
Regarding the emotions and beliefs about the decisions made in the UG or the DG, the 
desire to keep as much as possible for themselves was the most frequent mediator. 
Namely, in almost all the studies (except for the replication of the third study), such 
desire mediated, especially in the UG, the effect of the experimental conditions on 
offers. Other emotions and beliefs about the decisions, such as sense of justice and 
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empathy and, only for the UG, the fear of a rejection, tended to increase the offers. 
However, they did not work as mediators since they were not affected by the 
experimental conditions. Indeed, they are quite stable traits hardly influenced by 
situations.  
Finally, although no statistical comparison between Study 3 and its replication (study 
4) can be done, some similarities and differences in the respective results are 
noteworthy. Regarding the experimental procedure, the two studies were identical, with 
the only differences that in study 4, participants before to take part in our experiment 
were involved in another study and that they were paid volunteers, whereas in Italy 
they were unpaid volunteers and participated only in one experiment. Results obtained 
with the Italian sample showed a particular phenomenon for which: when the UG was 
played, the condition in which the opponent was needier elicited the lowest offers 
compared to the other experimental conditions; on the contrary, when the DG was 
played the same condition elicited the highest offers. With the Dutch sample instead, 
we found that in both games (UG and DG) the condition in which the other participant 
was needier elicited lowest offers compared to the other conditions. Indeed, in the UG, 
both Dutch and Italian samples seem to be sensible to bargaining power of receivers, 
they offering fewer points when such power is lower or absent. On the contrary, in the 
DG, where structurally receivers are always powerless, the two samples seem to have 
decided based on two opposite criteria: merit and need. Dutch participants have perhaps 
given less because they believed that receivers were responsible for the low score 
obtained; Italian participants have maybe given more because they perceived the 
receivers as being clearly at a disadvantage compared to them and more in need of 
being helped. 
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